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Introduction 
9Human beings do not live in a social void but are surrounded by other people and 
interact with them. Human beings are social creatures par excellence. Social psy-
chology focuses on the individual in his social environment and investigates the 
various phenomena and processes that may occur when individuals interact with 
their social environment. Social comparison theory is a typical social psychologi-
cal theory as it deals with issues such as how people evaluate themselves against 
others, what kinds of feelings people experience in response to seeing others do-
ing better or worse, whether people seek or avoid others who are doing better 
or worse, what kind of information people prefer to receive about others, what 
motives people may have to compare themselves with others, and with whom 
they prefer to compare themselves. The present dissertation focused particularly 
on how people may react when they encounter others who are doing better or 
worse than they are. In this first chapter, I give a brief overview of the literature 
on social comparison, and I will outline the theoretical basis of the issues that 
were investigated in the present thesis.
Different motives for choosing a comparison other. 
In the early studies of social comparison, three different motives for comparison 
were distinguished, which can be characterized as serving cognitive, affective, 
or behavioral goals. Firstly, people may compare themselves with others in or-
der to be able to evaluate themselves, which may be characterized as a cogni-
tive goal of social comparison. In the original formulation of social comparison 
theory, Festinger (1954) stated that people have a drive for an accurate evalua-
tion of their abilities and opinions. In the absence of objective standards, people 
will compare themselves with others, preferably with others who are somewhat 
better off. This preference for comparison with better-off others (upward com-
parison) was found in studies using the rank-order paradigm. In these studies, 
participants were asked to choose whose test-score they wanted to see, that of 
a person who outperformed them or that of a person who scored lower (e.g., 
Gruder, 1977, Wheeler et al., 1969). Secondly, the motive of self-enhancement 
was identified, stating that people may compare themselves with others in order 
to feel better about themselves (e.g., Thornton & Arrowood, 1966). This mo-
tive may be characterized as an affective goal of social comparison. Research 
into this motive has shown that particularly comparison with worse-off others 
A brief overview of social comparison theory
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(downward comparison) can serve the goal of self-enhancement, especially for 
people who experience some form of threat or who experience negative affect. 
Social comparison may then function as a way of “sustaining or reasserting the 
favorability of the individual’s self-regard” (Hakmiller, 1966, p. 37; see also Wills, 
1981). Thirdly, self-improvement was recognized as a motive for social compari-
son (Berger, 1977, Wood, 1989), which may be characterized as a behavioral goal 
of social comparison. Upward others can serve as models for self-improvement, 
because one can learn from observing them (Berger, 1977), or one can be in-
spired by their example (Brickman & Bulman, 1977). Taylor and Lobel (1989) sug-
gested that people may prefer different kinds of comparisons to serve different 
purposes. People under stress prefer to evaluate themselves against downward 
others to serve the motive of self-enhancement, but they prefer contact with and 
knowledge of upward others to serve the self-improvement motive. 
From choices of comparison others to responses 
to exposure to upward and downward others. 
Having first focused on the choice of comparison others, in the past decades, the 
focus of social comparison research has shifted to people’s responses to forced 
social comparisons. As Brickman and Bulman (1977) noted, people may be con-
fronted with comparison information that they would rather not encounter. How 
are people affected by these forced comparisons with upward and downward 
others? Morse and Gergen (1970) were probably the first to investigate the ef-
fects of forced social comparison. They had job-applicants wait for their inter-
views together with an applicant whose personal appearance was either highly 
desirable (Mr. Clean) or very undesirable (Mr. Dirty). The results showed that 
people who waited together with Mr. Dirty experienced an increase in self-
esteem, while those who waited together with Mr. Clean experienced a decrease 
in self-esteem. Later, research was conducted in which participants were pre-
sented with a bogus interview with a person who faced a situation similar to 
that of the participants, but who performed better or worse on the compari-
son dimension (e.g., Ybema & Buunk, 1995; Lockwood & Kunda, 1997, 1999). 
In general, studies using this bogus interview paradigm have demonstrated that 
no simple answer can be given to the question of how people are affected by 
forced upward and downward comparisons. Either direction appeared to have 
its ups and downs (e.g., Buunk, Collins, Taylor, VanYperen, & Dakof, 1990, see 
also Brickman & Bulman, 1977). Comparison with better-off others, for example, 
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may not only offer the opportunity to learn about how to improve oneself, but 
may also emphasize one’s inferior status. Likewise, exposure to downward others 
may offer the opportunity for a self-enhancing self-evaluative comparison, but 
may also show how one’s own situation may deteriorate. Researchers have iden-
tified a number of factors that may influence whether people are positively or 
negatively affected by exposure to upward and downward others, for example, 
the perceived vulnerability to the fate of the comparison other (e.g., Lockwood, 
2002), the personal importance of the comparison dimension (e.g., Tesser, 1988), 
the distinctness of others and the mutability of selves (Stapel & Koomen, 2000), 
psychological closeness (e.g., Pelham & Wachsmuth, 1995), and the well-being 
of the comparer (e.g., Buunk, Ybema, Gibbons, & Ipenburg, 2001c; VanderZee, 
Buunk, & Sanderman, 1998a). 
In order to understand and predict people’s responses to exposure to better- and 
worse-off others, in the present dissertation I focused on the processes that un-
derlie these responses. Depending on how people process the information about 
the other, either assimilative or contrastive responses may occur. Assimilation 
means that upward exposure evokes more positive responses than does down-
ward exposure, whereas contrast means that downward exposure evokes more 
positive responses than does upward exposure. As a framework or metaphor, we 
applied a dual-process perspective (Chaiken & Trope, 1999). Dual-process models 
assume that people process information using two independent, interactive sys-
tems. Epstein (see Epstein & Pacini, 1999; Epstein, 2003) distinguishes between a 
systematic or cognitive system and a holistic or experiential system. The cognitive 
system is a conscious system that operates by rules of logic, and it is analytic, ef-
fortful, relatively slow, affect-free, and highly demanding on cognitive resources. 
The experiential system, in contrast, operates by rules of affect, that is, it is ori-
ented towards facilitating pleasure and avoiding pain. Furthermore, it operates 
associatively and holistically, processing information rapidly, and it is difficult to 
change. When people encounter others who are either better or worse off, both 
systems may be involved in determining their responses to the exposure. That is, 
two fundamentally different processes may occur simultaneously and in parallel 
when people are exposed to others. Furthermore, the processes in each system 
The present dissertation
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may underlie fundamentally different kinds of responses, and steer them in op-
posite directions. It was predicted that, in the cognitive system, people would 
engage in a social comparison process in which the self and the other person 
were systematically compared with each other. This proces was predicted to lead 
to a contrastive response, particularly to self-evaluative responses. In the experi-
ential system, it was predicted that people would respond holistically and affec-
tively and would feel more or less connected with the other person or, in other 
words, would identify themselves with the other. This process was predicted to 
lead to an assimilative response, particularly to affective responses. 
The social comparison process. 
Following Wood (1996), social comparison was defined as the process in which 
people think about information about the other person in relation to the self by 
looking for and pointing out similarities and differences between themselves and 
the other. This search for similarities and differences is assumed to be a cognitive 
process in which the self and the target are systematically compared. The social 
comparison process probably consists of two stages. In the first stage, primarily 
similarities between the self and the other are assessed to determine whether the 
self and the target are comparable. There needs to be some degree of similarity 
between the self and the comparison target (see also Festinger, 1954). In the 
second stage, primarily differences are assessed. This is in line with the theory 
put forward by Gentner and Markman (1997), who suggested that, especially 
when a pair of items is similar, their differences are likely to be important. This 
assessment of differences results in a contrastive evaluation of the self. Studies of 
psychophysical judgment also typically showed that, when a target is compared 
with a relevant anchor, contrast effects are found. For example, in a study by 
Brown (1953), the participants were asked to judge a series of weights. It was 
found that participants contrasted the weights with an anchor that was consid-
ered relevant. When the anchor was too different from the stimulus weights, 
no contrast effects were found. In the present dissertation, it was hypothesized 
that after comparing themselves with a downward target people would evaluate 
themselves more positively, and that after comparing themselves with an upward 
target people would evaluate themselves more negatively. A study by Martin and 
Gentry (1997) offers some direct support for this hypothesis. They manipulated 
the motives of people viewing advertisements with highly attractive models by 
giving them instructions before they were handed the ads and by altering the 
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advertising headlines. When the motive of self-evaluation was induced, partly by 
an advertising headline saying ‘Who is better?’ and an advertising copy saying 
‘Compare yourself… Are you as beautiful?’, participants’ self-evaluations were 
less positive in response. Thus, the literal instruction to compare themselves led 
to a contrastive self-evaluative response (for similar results, see also Cattarin, 
Thompson, Thomas, & Williams, 2000). It must be noted that, in rare cases, the 
social comparison process may result in a perception of similarity between the 
self and the other, when no differences can be found. 
The identification process.
The second process that may occur when people are exposed to others is the 
identificaton process. Through holistic and affective processing in the experi-
ential system, people may identify themselves with an other person. Instead of 
reducing the situation to a one-dimensional comparison situation, people may 
perceive the other person in his or her totality, and may feel connected with the 
other person. This feeling is similar to the feelings one may have when reading a 
book or watching a movie and empathizing with one of the characters. Identifica-
tion is considered an automatic process that occurs without effort. The degree to 
which one identifies oneself with an other person is usually not volitional; rather, 
it is something that happens to a person, similar to one’s preferences (e.g., 
Zajonc, 1980). The identification process was expected to influence the affective 
responses to upward and downward exposure. We predicted that identification 
would lead to an assimilative affective response. That is, identification with an 
upward target was predicted to evoke primarily a positive affective response, 
and identification with a downward target was predicted to evoke primarily a 
negative affective response (see also Buunk et al.,2001c; Buunk, VanderZee, & 
VanYperen 2001b; Ybema & Buunk, 1995; Ybema, Buunk, & Heesink, 1996). 
Social comparison and identification are considered to be two fundamentally 
different processes by which people may respond to the experiences of others, 
leading to fundamentally different kinds of responses. Furthermore, social com-
parison and identification are assumed to occur simultaneously and to operate 
in parallel, similar to the cognitive and experiential systems (see Epstein, 2003). 
This implies that, when people are exposed to upward and downward others, 
assimilative and contrastive responses may occur simultaneously, but to different 
aspects (affect and self-evaluation). This simultaneous occurrence of assimilative 
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and contrastive responses has been reported before. In a study of marital satis-
faction, Buunk and Ybema (2003) found that exposure to a description of a hap-
pily or an unhappily married woman resulted in an assimilative response to affect 
and a contrastive response to self-evaluation (see also Bui & Pelham, 1999). 
Although social comparison and identification may occur simultaneously and 
operate in parallel, the affective responses are assumed to occur prior to the 
cognitive, self-evaluative responses. According to Epstein (2003), the experien-
tial system is a more rapidly reacting system than the cognitive system. This 
assumption of the primacy of the experiential system is also in line with Zajonc’s 
theory of affective primacy (1980), which holds that affective reactions are ba-
sic, automatic, and autonomous, occurring prior to and separate from cognitive 
responses. Consequently, first measuring people’s affective responses and, next, 
their self-evaluative responses would follow the sequence of their experiences 
most directly. We investigated, therefore, whether the strongest responses to 
exposure to upward and downward others would be found when the affective 
responses were assessed first and the self-evaluative responses next. 
Other theoretical perspectives. 
Other researchers also focused on the processes underlying the responses to up-
ward and downward exposure. Below, I briefly outline these different theories, 
and indicate how the present theory relates to them. Firstly, Buunk and Ybema 
(1997; see also Buunk and Ybema, 2003) proposed the identification-contrast 
model to explain the affective responses to upward and downward exposure. 
According to Buunk and Ybema, people generally strive for a sense of relative 
superiority. Therefore, people generally attempt to identify themselves with up-
ward others, that is, to regard the other’s fate as their own actual or possible fate 
and to recognize themselves in the other. In addition, people attempt to con-
trast themselves with downward others, that is, to focus on differences with the 
other. Upward identification and downward contrast are expected to evoke posi-
tive affect, whereas downward identification and upward contrast are expected 
to evoke negative affect. Secondly, Tesser (1988) proposed the Self-Evaluation 
Maintenance Model. This model describes two processes that may occur when 
people are confronted with the outstanding performance of an other person 
(upward other): reflection and social comparison. Reflection occurs when the 
performance is not relevant to a person’s self-definition. One may then bask 
in the reflected glory of the other’s performance and, thereby, increase one’s 
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self-evaluation. Social comparison occurs when the performance is relevant to 
a person’s self-definition and results in a contrast-effect on self-evaluation. The 
self-evaluative effects are expected to be reflected in affect (Tesser, Millar, & 
Moore, 1988). Thirdly, Gilbert, Giesler, & Morris (1995) proposed two successive 
processes that may occur in a comparison situation. First, people will automati-
cally compare themselves with others, resulting in contrastive responses. Next, 
they may or may not undo the comparison depending on how logically appro-
priate they find the comparison. Fourthly, Stapel and Suls (2003) distinguished 
between an interpretation process and a comparison process (see also Stapel & 
Koomen, 2000, 2001). These researchers argued that the consequences of expo-
sure to others depend on how people use the information about the other. In 
the interpretation process, the information about the other is used to define or 
interpret the self, such that the information is included in the self, resulting in 
assimilative responses. In contrast, in the comparison process, the information 
about the other is used as a reference point to evaluate the self against, such that 
the information is excluded from the self and contrast is the typical result. Finally, 
Mussweiler (2003; see also Mussweiler & Strack, 2000) proposed that people 
may engage in a process of either similarity testing or dissimilarity testing when 
they are exposed to upward or downward others. In the process of similarity 
testing, people test the hypothesis that they are similar to the comparison target, 
which leads to a selective increase in the accessibility of knowledge, indicating 
that they are in fact similar. This process results in assimilative responses. In the 
process of dissimilarity testing, people test the hypothesis that they are dissimilar 
to the comparison target, which leads to a selective increase in the accessibility 
of knowledge indicating that they are in fact dissimilar. This process results in 
contrastive responses. 
What these different theories have in common is that they all distinguish be-
tween two processes, mostly one process underlying assimilative responses and 
the other underlying contrastive responses. The identification process of Buunk 
and Ybema and the interpretation process of Stapel seem to describe a similar 
process, comparable to the identification process we proposed. Yet, in contrast 
to them, we proposed that the identification process is an automatic and primary 
process, underlying specifically affective responses. The reflection process that 
Tesser describes seems to be of a different order than the identification process. 
Basking in the reflected glory of a close other has more to do with taking pride 
in the performance of the other, and with benefiting from being associated with 
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that outstanding other, and does not influence one’s own self-evaluation on the 
specific comparison dimension. The contrast process of Buunk and Ybema seems 
similar to the comparison process of Stapel and Tesser, and to the comparison 
process we proposed. In all theories, social comparison is the process in which 
the self is compared with an other person, resulting in a contrastive response. 
Our model explicitly states that this process operates according to the rules of 
the cognitive system, and specifically underlies self-evaluative responses. In con-
trast to Gilbert’s et al. theory, our model assumes that the social comparison 
process is a deliberate process and not an automatic process, and that instead 
identification is an automatic process, leading to assimilative responses to affect. 
The processes of similarity and dissimilarity testing of Mussweiler, we propose, 
are both part of the social comparison process. As outlined above, it seems that 
different words are sometimes used for processes that are similar. In addition, we 
argue that the various perspectives may be complementary. The various theories 
may all add to our understanding of how people are influenced by seeing others 
who are doing better or worse. For example, the theories put forward by both 
Mussweiler and Stapel are grounded in an informational perspective on compari-
son processes in social judgment, and theory of and research into knowledge 
accessibility effects (for references, see Mussweiler, 2003; Stapel & Koomen, 
2000; 2001). Such theories may help to direct research to the more fundamental 
processes that take place at a micro-level, that is, at the cognitive level at which 
the processes occur in people’s minds. Our theorizing adds by proposing that it 
is important to distinguish between different kinds of responses, and that one 
process may be more primary and automatic, and that another process may be 
a more controlled and analytic process (but see also Gilbert, Giesler, & Morris, 
1995). 
Besides investigating the influence of the processes underlying people’s respons-
es to better- and worse-off others, in the present dissertation the influence of 
two individual differences measures was investigated. First, people may differ in 
the degree to which they are inclined to compare themselves with others or to 
base the evaluation of their own characteristics on how others are doing. These 
individual differences are captured by social comparison orientation (SCO). Sec-
ond, people’s responses to others doing better or worse may also partly depend 
on how well they are doing themselves, that is, on their subjective well-being
Introduction
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Social comparison orientation.
In research into social comparison, it was originally assumed that there is a 
universal drive in the human organism to evaluate one’s opinions and abilities 
through comparison with others (Festinger, 1954). Later, researchers noted some 
inconsistencies in people’s claims about their social comparison activities. For 
example, in a study by Wood, Taylor, and Lichtman (1985) among women suf-
fering from breast cancer, many patients expressed comparisons with fellow pa-
tients in open interviews while they did not admit them when asked directly. 
Therefore, researchers assumed that people may be reluctant to admit compar-
ing themselves with others because they consider it socially undesirable to do 
so, or because they are unaware of their social comparisons (cf., Brickman & 
Bulman, 1977, Wills, 1981; Wood, et al., 1985; Wood, 1996). However, Gibbons 
and Buunk (1999) argued that the extent to which people compare themselves 
with others may actually vary from one individual to the next. They developed 
a scale measuring individual differences in social comparison orientation, the 
Iowa-Netherlands Comparison Orientation Measure (INCOM). This scale con-
sists of questions assessing people’s orientation towards comparing themselves 
with others and towards basing the evaluation of their characteristics primarily 
on how others are doing. Research using this measure showed that SCO may 
strongly influence people’s social comparison activities and the degree to which 
people are affected by comparison with others. Firstly, SCO has been shown to 
be related to an increased interest in information about others facing a similar 
situation. In a study by VanderZee, Oldersma, Buunk, & Bos (1998b), for example, 
cancer patients were given the opportunity to read short interviews with fellow 
patients about their experiences. It was found that, as participants had higher 
SCO, they read more interviews. In another study, it was found that test-takers 
with higher SCO were more interested in the test-scores of previous test-takers 
than were participants low in SCO (Gibbons & Buunk, 1999). Secondly, SCO has 
been found to be related to a higher frequency of comparison with worse- and 
better-off others (Buunk, Zurriaga, Gonzalez-Roma, & Subirats, 2003). Thirdly, 
SCO has been found to influence identification with others. Buunk et al. (2001c) 
found that SCO influenced the degree of identification with an upward target. 
However, Brenninkmeijer (2002) found that SCO did not influence the degree of 
identification with either an upward or a downward target. Instead, she found 
that SCO moderated the effect of upward identification on affect. That is, SCO 
was found to enhance the degree of positive affect people derived from identify-
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ing with the upward target. Although SCO thus appears to affect identification 
with others, the findings are not unequivocal. Fourthly, SCO has been found to 
influence people’s responses to comparison with particularly worse-off others. 
In one study (Buunk, et al, 2001c), SCO was found to enhance the assimilative 
response to exposure to worse-off others, that is, high-SCO individuals expe-
rienced more negative affect following downward exposure than did low-SCO 
individuals. In another study, it was found that particularly individuals high in 
SCO reported increases in relationship satisfaction when they were instructed to 
name features in which their relationship was better than that of others, when 
they were initially relatively dissatisfied (Buunk, Oldersma, & DeDreu, 2001a). Fi-
nally, in a study of relative deprivation among nurses (Buunk et al., 2003), it was 
found that SCO enhanced adverse responses to comparison with both upward 
and downward colleagues. The study showed that particularly nurses with a high 
SCO who derived negative feelings from comparison with worse-off colleagues 
felt more relatively deprived nine to ten months later. However, comparing them-
selves with upward colleagues, and deriving either positive or negative feelings 
from that, also increased feelings of relative deprivation particularly among nurses 
high in SCO. 
To conclude, SCO unmistakably influences how people respond to upward and 
downward others, as it increases interest in and comparison with others, influ-
ences identification with others, and influences affective and self-evaluative re-
sponses to upward and downward exposure. However, the precise influence of 
SCO is not yet fully understood, as the results do not unequivocally show under 
what conditions people are either more positively or more negatively affected by 
upward and downward exposure, depending on their SCO levels. This may partly 
be explained by the fact that diverse types of social comparison were inves-
tigated. In the study by Buunk et al. (2003), for example, the participants were 
retrospectively asked about their comparisons with colleagues, whereas, in the 
study by Buunk et al. (2001a), downward comparison was installed by asking the 
participants to mention features of their relationship in which they considered 
their relationship to be better than that of most others. However, also within a 
single paradigm, the results are not clear-cut. Therefore, in the present disser-
tation, the mechanisms through which individual differences in SCO influence 
people’s reactions to social comparison were investigated. In the model that we 
have outlined above, there are two possible ways in which SCO may influence 
people’s responses to upward and downward exposure. One possibility is that 
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SCO influences the information processing, that is, the degree to which people 
compare and identify themselves with others. The other possibility is that SCO 
influences the degree to which people are influenced by comparing or identify-
ing themselves with others. That is, it may be that particularly people with high 
SCO change their self-evaluation when they compare themselves with others, 
and derive negative feelings from downward identification and positive feelings 
from upward identification. In the present dissertation, both possibilities were 
investigated. As described in Chapter 4, it was particularly hypothesized that 
SCO may enhance identification with upward and downward others, and the 
effects of that identification. This hypothesis was partly based on the conclu-
sion of Gibbons and Buunk (1999) that, based on various relations of SCO with 
other scales, the prototypical comparer may be characterized as a person who is 
interpersonally more than introspectively oriented and sensitive to the behavior 
of others. That is, people with high SCO relate more to other people than peo-
ple with low SCO, and may thus identify themselves more with others, and may 
be more sensitive to the degree to which they identify themselves with others. 
Furthermore, previous research showed that people with a high SCO are more in-
terested in comparing their qualities and characteristics with those of others and 
do so more often than do people with a low SCO (Buunk et al., 2003; Gibbons & 
Buunk, 1999; VanderZee et al., 1998b). Apparently, individuals with higher SCO 
more often consider others to be suitable comparison others. Suitable usually 
means more similar. As Festinger (1954) noted, making a comparison between 
oneself and another person requires that the other person is not too divergent 
from oneself. In addition, Mussweiler (2003) argued that, in most comparison 
situations, people are likely to initially focus on fundamental ways in which the 
target and the standard are similar. Therefore, we assumed that individuals high 
in SCO, in general, are more inclined to regard others as similar to themselves, or 
in other words, to identify themselves with others than individuals low in SCO.
Subjective well-being.
Subjective well-being was the second individual difference variable whose influ-
ence on responses to upward and downward others was investigated. According 
to Wills (1980), people who are low in subjective well-being may use comparison 
with others as a way to enhance their subjective well-being, specifically through 
comparison with worse-off others. Many studies have shown that people who 
are under threat may benefit from comparison with worse-off others (e.g., 
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Affleck, Tennen, Urrows, Higgins, & Abeles, 2001; Aspinwall & Taylor, 1993; 
Buunk, et al., 2001a; Gibbons, 1986, Gibbons, Lane, Gerrard, Reis-Bergan, 
Lautrup, Pexa, & Blanton, 2002; Wood, Michela, & Giordano, 2000; for a review, 
see Tennen, McKee, & Affleck, 2000). However, other studies have shown that 
exposure to a downward target may also affect people negatively (e.g., Ybema, 
et al., 1996). In this dissertation, we proposed that the responses to exposure 
to a downward other depend on the way in which the information about the 
other is processed, that is, on whether people compare or identify themselves 
with the downward other. We expected that, when threatened people compare 
themselves with the downward other, they may feel better afterwards. How-
ever, we expected that, when they identify themselves with the downward oth-
ers, they may be negatively influenced. Furthermore, because threatened people 
resemble the downward target, that is, they are both doing poorly, it may be 
that threatened people are more inclined to identify themselves with a down-
ward target than to compare themselves with the downward target. Indeed, 
several studies have shown that people with low subjective well-being identify 
themselves more with downward others than do people with high subjective 
well-being, and concurrently respond with more negative affect to downward 
exposure. For example, Buunk et al. (2001c) found that therapists with higher 
levels of burnout identified themselves more with a downward target than did 
those with a lower level of burnout. Furthermore, when those high in burn-
out were also high in SCO, they concurrently derived more negative affect from 
downward exposure. Likewise, in a study among people who had recently lost 
their jobs, Ybema, et al. (1996) found that when people experienced more stress 
they identified themselves more with the downward target and experienced less 
positive affect in response to downward exposure (for similar results, see also 
VanderZee, et al., 1998a). However, when people with a low subjective well-be-
ing compare, rather than identify, themselves with the downward target, for 
example, when they are instructed to do so, we predicted that they may benefit 
from it. A study by Buunk et al. (2001a) of relationship satisfaction is noteworthy 
in this respect. Their study showed that people who were relatively discontent 
with their relationship, in other words, those who were low in subjective well-
being, could enhance their satisfaction through downward comparison. Because 
the participants in the downward comparison condition were instructed to list 
features of their relationship in which they considered their relationship to be 
better than that of most others, we assume that it was particularly a comparison 
Introduction
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process that brought about these beneficial effects. It must be noted that only 
those who were high in SCO benefited from this downward comparison, and not 
those low in SCO. In the present dissertation, therefore, we further investigated 
the role of SCO in this respect. We hypothesized that in respect of people who 
are low in subjective well-being, particularly those with a high SCO may benefit 
from comparing themselves with a downward other, not only when they purely 
cognitively compare themselves with worse-off others, as in the study of Buunk 
et al. (2001a), but also when they are exposed to a downward target. These 
predictions were investigated as recounted in Chapters 4 and 5. Furthermore, as 
described in Chapter 5, we investigated whether comparison with a downward 
target would be beneficial not only for people with a low subjective well-being, 
but, more generally, for people for whom the comparison dimension is person-
ally important. 
In the majority of studies in this dissertation, the comparison dimension was 
social integration among first-year students. Social integration is an important 
topic for most people when they start their studies, since they usually move to an 
unfamiliar city where they do not know many people. Therefore, as a conceptual 
analogue to subjective well-being measures in other studies, participants’ feel-
ings of loneliness were assessed, and the role of loneliness in the responses to ex-
posure to worse-off others was investigated, as described in Chapters 4 and 5. 
 
To summarize, in the present dissertation, we investigated people’s affective and 
self-evaluative responses to exposure to an upward or a downward target, and 
expected these responses to be fundamentally different. Central in our investi-
gation was the distinction between two processes that we expected to underlie 
these responses, namely, a social comparison process and an identification pro-
cess. In addition, the influence of individual differences in people’s inclination to 
compare their characteristics with those of others was assessed, as was the influ-
ence of individual differences in subjective well-being. The following chapters are 
briefly outlined below: 
Chapter 2. 
From a dual-process approach, we investigated people’s responses to exposure 
to upward and downward others. We distinguished between a social comparison 
Overview of the chapters
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process that we assumed to operate according to the rules of a cognitive sys-
tem, and an identification process that we assumed to operate according to the 
rules of an experiential system. The social comparison process was expected to 
underlie the contrastive self-evaluative responses, and the identification process 
was expected to underlie assimilative affective responses. Two experiments were 
conducted. In the first experiment, the degrees to which the participants had 
compared and identified themselves with the targets were retrospectively as-
sessed and related to their affective and self-evaluative responses. In the second 
experiment, social comparison and identification with the targets were experi-
mentally manipulated by giving the participants instructions before they read the 
information about the upward or downward target. In addition, the influence of 
individual differences in social comparison orientation was investigated. 
Chapter 3.
The interplay between the affective and the self-evaluative responses to expo-
sure to others who are either better off or worse off was investigated. It was 
assumed that the affective reactions are primary and that the self-evaluative re-
actions are secondary. Therefore, it was predicted that the strongest effects on 
both the affective and the self-evaluative responses would be found when the 
affective responses were assessed first and the self-evaluative responses next. In 
addition, individual differences in social comparison orientation were expected 
to moderate the responses to upward and downward exposure. 
Chapter 4. 
The influence of individual differences in social comparison orientation on re-
sponses to upward and downward exposure was further investigated. It was 
predicted that people high in SCO would identify themselves more with upward 
and downward others than would people low in SCO and, therefore, respond 
more positively to upward exposure and more negatively to downward exposure. 
We expected that people’s low levels of well-being, loneliness in this research, 
would moderate these effects. We predicted that people high in SCO would 
identify themselves more with a downward target, particularly when they were 
relatively lonely, and consequently respond more negatively to downward ex-
posure than people low in SCO. Likewise, we predicted that people high in SCO 
would identify themselves more with an upward target than would people low 
in SCO, particularly when they were not lonely, and consequently respond more 
positively to upward exposure. 
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Chapter 5.
We investigated how, when, and for whom exposure to a lively description of a 
downward target would be beneficial. Concerning the question of how, it was 
investigated whether a social comparison process or an identification process 
would lead to more beneficial effects on the self-evaluative or the affective re-
sponses. Concerning the question of when, it was examined whether it is par-
ticularly when people are low in subjective well-being, (cf., Wills, 1981), or, more 
generally, when people find the comparison dimension personally important 
that downward comparison is beneficial. Concerning the question of who, we 
predicted that only people with a high social comparison orientation would ben-
efit from downward comparison. 
Chapter 6.
 In the last chapter, the main findings of the studies in this dissertation are inte-
grated and discussed. In addition, the implications of these findings for theory of 
and research into social comparison issues, as well as some practical implications, 
are outlined.
Finally, it should be noted that the following chapters comprise submitted re-
search articles that can be read on their own, independent of the other chap-
ters. As a consequence, there is some overlap in the theoretical introductions 
and method sections of these chapters. Also, in contrast to the other Chapters, 
dual process theory was not explicitly used in the theoretical introductions of 
Chapters 4 and 5. Instead, in Chapter 6 it is discussed how the research of those 
Chapters can be integrated into a dual process approach. 
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The dual response to comparison
but feeling happy: 
Doing worse than others,
and identification with others
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Abstract - Taking a dual-process perspective, we investigated people’s responses to exposure to 
others who are better or worse off. We distinguished between a social comparison process that we 
assumed to operate according to the rules of a cognitive system and an identification process that 
we assumed to operate according to the rules of an experiential system. We predicted that the social 
comparison process would lead to a contrastive self-evaluative response and that the identification 
process would lead to an assimilative global affective response. In the first experiment, involving 
197 participants, correlational evidence was found to support these predictions. In the second ex-
periment, involving 148 participants, additional support was found when identification and social 
comparison were experimentally manipulated. Individual differences in social comparison orienta-
tion predicted both the degree of comparison and the degree of identification and, in Experiment 1, 
social comparison orientation enhanced the responses to identification with the upward target. 
Imagine that on a lazy afternoon you are drinking a cup of tea and reading a 
magazine. In this magazine is an interview with a student who recently moved 
to a different city to start her studies at the university there, just like you recently 
did. She says that she is rather unhappy because she has hardly any friends to 
visit and feels lonely. How would reading this interview make you feel and how 
would it influence your evaluation of your own social life? Likewise, if she told 
that she was very happy because she had made many new friends and had a very 
good social life, how would reading the interview make you feel then and how 
would it influence your evaluation of your own social life? 
Reading such an interview may evoke strong responses in people, for example 
when it evokes positive or negative feelings or changes the evaluation of their 
own situation. Several studies have been conducted that investigated people’s 
responses to these forced exposure to others who are either better (upward 
others) or worse off (downward others). In general, these studies have demon-
strated that no simple answer can be given to the question how people respond 
to these forced exposures to upward and downward others. Either direction ap-
peared to have its ups and downs (e.g., Buunk, Collins, Taylor, VanYperen, & 
Dakof, 1990, see also Brickman & Bulman, 1977; for reviews, see Suls & Wheeler, 
2000; and Blanton, 2001). Exposure to better-off others, for example, offers both 
the opportunity to be inspired, but may also emphasize one’s inferior status. 
Likewise, exposure to downward others may show that one is relatively well-
off, but may also show how one’s own situation may deteriorate. To get more 
insight in the responses to upward and downward exposure, researchers have 
begun to focus on the underlying processes. Depending on how people process 
This chapter is based on: Groothof, H.A.K., Buunk, A.P., & Siero, F.W. (2003). Doing worse than others, but feeling 
happy: The dual response to comparison and identification with others. Manuscript submitted for publication. 
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the information about the other, assimilative or contrastive responses may occur. 
Assimilation means that upward exposure evokes positive responses and down-
ward exposure evokes negative responses, whereas contrast means that upward 
exposure evokes negative responses and downward exposure evokes positive 
responses. For example, Mussweiler (2003) proposed that people may engage 
either in a process of testing for similarity between the self and the other or in 
a process of testing for dissimilarity. Similarity testing would typically result in 
assimilative responses while dissimilarity testing would typically result in contras-
tive responses. Stapel and Suls (2003) distinguished between an interpretation 
and a comparison process (see also Stapel & Koomen, 2000, 2001) depending 
on whether people use the information about the other to interpret the self or 
to evaluate the self against. Interpretation would typically result in assimilative 
responses and comparison in contrastive responses. The present research also 
focussed on the processes underlying assimilative and contrastive responses to 
upward and downward exposure. Similar to Stapel and colleagues, and 
Mussweiler we distinguished between two processes, one underlying assimila-
tive responses and one underlying contrastive responses. However, in contrast to 
them, we applied a dual-process perspective (Chaiken & Trope, 1999), implying 
that we distinguished between two fundamentally different kinds of processes 
that occur simultaneously and operate in parallel, underlying fundamentally dif-
ferent kinds of responses.
 
Dual-process approach.
Most dual-process theories assume that people process information by two in-
dependent, interactive systems. Epstein (2003; see also Epstein & Pacini, 1999) 
distinguishes between a systematic or cognitive system and a holistic or experi-
ential system. The cognitive system is a conscious system that operates by rules 
of logic and it is analytic, effortful, relatively slow, affect free, and highly de-
manding on cognitive resources. The experiential system, in contrast, is an af-
fective system oriented at facilitating pleasure and avoiding pain. Furthermore, 
it operates in an associative and holistic way, processing information rapidly. 
When people encounter others who are either better-off or worse-off both sys-
tems are involved in determining people’s responses to the exposure. Within the 
cognitive system people may systematically compare themselves with the other. 
When people compare themselves with another person they are thinking about 
information about the other person in relation to the self by looking for and 
Social comparison and identification 
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pointing out similarities and differences between the self and the other (Wood, 
1996). This analytic search for similarities and differences we expected to eventu-
ally result in a conclusion about their standing vis-à-vis the other person. In other 
words, we hypothesized that when people compare themselves with someone 
else, they use the other as a reference-point to evaluate the self against (see also 
Mussweiler, 2001; Stapel & Koomen, 2000; Tesser, 1988) and will come up with 
a self-evaluative response. Furthermore, we expected that this self-evaluative re-
sponse would be contrastive, that is, we predicted that after comparison with a 
downward target, people would evaluate themselves more positively and after 
comparison with a downward target more negatively.
Within the experiential system people may identify themselves with someone else, 
that is, they may recognize themselves in the other and feel a bond between them-
selves and the other. Identification is primarily an affective and spontaneous process. 
Unlike the social comparison process, identification does not occur sequentially but 
more rapidly and holistically. Instead of reducing the situation to a one-dimen-
sional comparison situation people may perceive the other person in his or her total-
ity and feel connected with the other person. The identification process we expected 
to influence the global affective responses to upward and downward exposure. We 
predicted that identification would lead to assimilative affective responses, that is, 
identification with upward targets would evoke positive feelings and identification 
with downward targets would evoke negative feelings. Several other researchers 
have linked identification to assimilative responses on affect (Brenninkmeijer, 2002; 
Buunk, VanderZee, VanYperen, 2001b; Buunk, Ybema, Gibbons, & Ipenburg, 2001c; 
Ybema & Buunk, 1995; Ybema, Buunk, & Heesink, 1996), and a study by Ybema 
(1994) provides direct support for our hypothesis. His study showed that the more 
participants identified themselves with an upward target, the more positive affect the 
upward exposure evoked and that the more participants identified themselves with 
the downward target, the more negative affect the downward exposure evoked. In 
sum, social comparison and identification are two fundamentally different processes 
that we expected to occur simultaneously when people encounter others, leading to 
fundamentally different kinds of responses in opposite directions.
Social comparison orientation.
People differ in the degree to which they tend to compare themselves and their 
situation with others and in the degree to which they base the evaluation of their 
characteristics on how others are doing. Gibbons and Buunk (1999) developed 
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a scale for measuring people’s Social Comparison Orientation (SCO). Research 
including SCO has, in general, shown that people with higher SCO are more 
interested in information about others (Gibbons & Buunk, 1999; VanderZee, Older-
sma, Buunk, & Bos, 1998b) and compare themselves more frequently with others 
doing better or worse (Buunk, Zurriaga, Gonzalez-Roma, Subirats, 2003). In ad-
dition, among people with a high SCO, exposure to others doing better or worse 
has been found to evoke stronger responses than among people with a low SCO 
(Buunk et al., 2001c). For example, Buunk, Oldersma & DeDreu (2001a) found 
that people who were dissatisfied with their intimate relation and who were 
high in SCO benefited from comparing characteristics of their intimate relation-
ship with characteristics of the relationship of couples who were worse-off. In 
conclusion, SCO is a measurable concept that amplifies responses to upward and 
downward exposure. An important question, however, remains at which point 
SCO exerts this amplifying influence. One possibility is that SCO amplifies the in-
formation processing, that is, the degree to which people compare and identify 
themselves with upward and downward others. The other possibility is that SCO 
amplifies the degree to which people are influenced by comparing and identify-
ing themselves with others. In fact, a study by Brenninkmeijer (2002) showed 
that SCO enhanced the amount of positive affect people derived from identifying 
with the upward target. The present research investigated both possibilities, and 
tried to replicate the finding of Brenninkmeijer. 
Overview of the present research. 
We did two experiments in which we investigated the role of two processes on 
the responses to exposure to upward and downward others; social comparison 
and identification. In both experiments the participants were exposed to an in-
terview with either an upward or a downward target. The comparison dimension 
was the social life of first-year students. Starting a study in an unknown city is 
for many people an important transitional time in which forming new friend-
ships and building up a new social network have high priority. Comparison and 
identification with others who are either more or less successful in that respect 
may evoke strong responses in first-year students. In Experiment 1, we assessed 
the degree to which the participants compared and identified themselves with 
the targets and related that to their affective and self-evaluative responses. We 
predicted that the more they compared themselves, the more positive their self-
evaluative responses would be after downward exposure, and the more negative their 
Social comparison and identification 
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self-evaluative response would be after exposure to the upward target. In addi-
tion, we predicted that the more people identified themselves, the more positive 
affect upward exposure would evoke and the more negative affect downward 
exposure would evoke. In Experiment 2, social comparison and identification with 
the upward and downward targets were experimentally manipulated. We predicted 
that the comparison instruction would enhance the contrastive self-evaluative 
response, and that the identification instruction would enhance the assimilative 
affective response. In both experiments, social comparison orientation was in-
cluded to further investigate its effect. 
Method
During an obligatory first-year psychology course, 197 students participated in 
the paper-and-pencil experiment. The average age of the participants was 20 
years (SD = 1.73). First, some demographic questions were asked, followed by 
the measure of SCO. 
Social comparison orientation. 
Individual differences in SCO were measured using the Iowa-Netherlands Com-
parison Orientation Measure (Gibbons & Buunk, 1999). This scale consists of 11 
items such as “I always pay a lot of attention to how I do things compared with 
how others do things” and “I never consider my situation in life relative to that of 
other people” (reversed). The items were measured using 5-point scales 
(1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). Internal consistency of the scale was 
very good (alpha = .80). 
Interview fragment. 
To ensure realism, we based the description of the upward and downward tar-
get on actual in-depth interviews with first-year students and presented them 
as newspaper-articles. The articles describe an interview with first-year student 
about his or her social life (the sex of the target was not specified). In the upward 
version, the student is very positive about his or her social life. The student has 
become acquainted with many fellow-students, has formed good friendships 
with some of them, gets along with roommates, and can always find someone 
to have fun with or have a good conversation with. In the downward version, 
Experiment 1
Participants and procedure
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the student is rather negative about his or her social life. The student has no real 
friends and tells of standing alone during breaks at college, having hardly any 
contact with roommates, and being alone often, watching TV, or studying. 
To test whether people could actually relate the information about the upward 
and downward target(2) to themselves and whether they could compare and 
identify themselves with them we conducted a pre-study using a thought-list-
ing method. The 56 participants each typed on average 11 lines of text on the 
computer. In both the upward and the downward conditions, most participants 
made statements concerning themselves. In the upward condition, 85% of the 
participants listed thoughts and feelings concerning themselves and 52% made 
statements concerning solely themselves. In the downward condition, 70% lis-
ting thoughts and feelings concerning themselves and 22% made statements 
solely concerning themselves. These statements reflected both social comparison 
processes and identification processes.  For example, the social comparison re-
sponse of a participant who read the upward interview:
“I also found it rather scary to start my studies, but I was also looking forward to 
it. I worried about feeling lonely in my room. That is why I stayed with my parents 
at first. I did not make very close friends in Groningen; it is very nice though.
I also want to find a sideline 
I do have some friends but they are not always around when I feel like doing 
something nice, I think that’s a pity, but I can also have fun on my own”
Other participants clearly stated whether they could identify with the target. 
Examples are: 
“Very recognizable”
“I remember feeling exactly the same when I started my studies.”
 “I find it recognizable that you have the feeling of getting lonely, to have less 
social contacts than you used to have.”
In conclusion, the thought listing showed that the participants’ dominant re-
sponse to upward and downward exposure was to relate the information about 
the target to themselves, either through comparing or identifying themselves. 
Social comparison and identification 
Preliminary test of the interviews
2)  There were actually four versions of the interview fragments in the thought-listing study, as effort was included 
as an extra factor. At the end of the interview, the student made a statement about how much effort he or she 
had put into building up a new social network (high or low). Because effort was not a central factor in our study, 
we decided to leave it out in our later experiments by simply removing the last few lines of text in the interviews 
and not to discuss it here. 
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Affective response.
 Participants’ positive and negative affective responses were measured by asking; 
“To what extent does this fragment arouse positive feelings in you?” and “To 
what extent does this fragment arouse negative feelings in you?”. Answers were 
given on a 5-point scale (1 = not, 5 = very strongly). The correlation between 
both items was -.79 (p < .001). They, therefore, could be combined into one 
scale, with higher values indicating a more positive affective response.
Self-evaluative response. 
Participants’ self-evaluative response to the interviews was measured using 4 
items. One example of such an item is “after reading this interview fragment, to 
what extent do you worry more or less about your own social life, or has nothing 
changed?”. Answers were given on a 9-point scale (1 = much more worried, 5 = 
no change, and 9 = much less worried). Higher scores indicated that the partici-
pants’ evaluative response was more positive. Internal consistency was good (al-
pha .81). Because people may be reluctant to admit being affected by upward or 
downward exposure (see Wood, 1996), a short introduction was given in which it 
was explained that it is quite common for most, but not all, people to be affected 
by information about others. Nevertheless, 23.3% of the participants indicated 
that their self-evaluations had not changed (i.e., answered 5 on every question). 
Degrees of social comparison and identification. 
The degree of social comparison was measured using the following items: 
“To what extent did you start thinking about yourself and your own social life?”, 
“To what extent did you compare your own situation with that of this person?”, 
“To what extent did you look for differences and similarities between yourself 
and this person?”, and “To what extent were you inclined to assess how good or 
bad your social life is?”. Identification with the target was measured using the 
following items (see also Brenninkmeijer, 2002): “Could you recognize yourself 
in this person?”, “Did you think you resemble this person?”, and “To what extent 
did you think that in the future things might become (or stay) the same for you 
as for this person?”. Answers were given on  5-point scales (1 = not, 5 = very 
strong). The internal consistency of both scales was very good; Cronbach’s alpha 
was .92 for the social comparison scale and .84 for the identification scale. 
Dependent measures
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Manipulation check. 
To check whether participants actually perceived the upward target as better off 
and the downward target as worse-off, they were asked to indicate on a 9-point 
scale how they rated the target’s social life in comparison with their own social 
lives (1 = much worse, 5 = about the same, and 9 = much better). 
Results(3)
Manipulation check.
A Univariate Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) revealed that, in comparison with 
their own social lives, participants rated the target’s social life as higher in the 
upward condition than in the downward condition (M = 5.2, SD = 1.34 vs. M = 
3.1, SD = 2.48; F(1,191) = 49.34, p < .001). However, only the mean rating in the 
downward condition differed significantly from 5, the point at which the target’s 
social life is equally good as the participants’ own (t(97) = -7.45, p < .001). Thus, 
the participants did evaluate the downward target as inferior, but did not evalu-
ate the upward target as superior, but as equally well-off. Although we now, of 
course, can not draw conclusions on how people respond to genuinely upward 
others, this limitation does not impede the testing of the main hypotheses. In 
fact, this situation offers a more stringent test on whether identification will 
evoke an assimilative response on affect and whether comparison will evoke a 
contrastive response on self-evaluation. 
In order to investigate the effects of direction of exposure, and SCO on the de-
gree to which participants compared and identified themselves, a series of hier-
archical regression analyses were performed. In the first step of these analyses, 
the main effects of direction of exposure, and SCO were entered. In the second 
step, the interaction between both predictors was entered. Following Aiken and 
West (1991) the continuous independent variable (SCO) was standardized and 
the B-values will be reported instead of the ß-values. 
Degree of social comparison. 
There was a main effect of SCO on social comparison (B = .37, p < .001), indicat-
ing that respondents with higher SCO compared themselves more. In addition, 
Social comparison and identification 
Degrees of social comparison and identification
with the upward and downward target
3) All p-values below .10 were given and the accompanying effects were discussed when we had
one-sided hypotheses concerning those effects. P-values above .10 were considered not signicant.
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a main effect of direction of exposure was found (B = -.22, p = .001), indicating 
that participants compared themselves more with the downward target than 
with the upward target. The two-way interaction was not significant (R²-change 
< .001; F < 1). 
Degree of identification. 
There was a main effect of SCO (B = .18, p = .005), indicating that identification 
was higher among participants with higher SCO. In addition, there was a main 
effect of direction (B = .18, p = .004), indicating that participants identified 
themselves more with the upward target than with the downward target. The 
two-way interaction was not significant (R²-change = .002; F < 1). 
We predicted that comparison would result in contrastive responses on self-
evaluation and that identification would result in assimilative responses on affect. 
In addition, it was investigated whether SCO moderated these responses. To test 
these hypotheses, two series of hierarchical regression analyses were performed 
separately for the prediction of the affective and the self-evaluative response 
using direction of exposure, SCO, and degree of identification or degree of social 
comparison as predictors. First, the three main effects were entered. Next, three 
regressions were run in which each two-way interaction was entered next to the 
main effects, to see whether each two-way interaction significantly contributed 
to the prediction of the dependent variable. After the three two-way interactions 
were entered into the equation, the three-way interaction was added. 
The self-evaluative responses to upward and downward social comparison. 
There was a significant main effect of direction (B = -.43, p < .001), indicating 
that participants’ self-evaluative responses were more positive after downward 
exposure than after upward exposure (contrastive response). In the second step, 
the expected two-way interaction between direction and social comparison was 
significant (R²-change = .034, F(1,180) = 8.40, p = .004). Inspection of the simple 
slopes revealed that, in line with our predictions, the more participants compa-
red themselves with the downward target, the more positive their self-evaluative 
responses were (B = .21, p = .037). Also, the more they compared themselves 
with the upward target, the more negative their self-evaluative responses were 
The affective and self-evaluative responses to comparison 
and identification with upward and downward others
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(B =-.18, p = .042) (see Figure 1). Thus, both upward and downward comparison 
increased the contrastive self-evaluative response. No main or interaction effects 
of SCO were found, indicating that SCO did not enhance the self-evaluative res-
ponse to comparison with the upward and downward target.
 Figure 1. 
 Self-evaluative response to upward and downward 
 exposure as a function of degree of social comparison. 
The affective responses to upward and downward identification. 
There was a main effect of direction of exposure (B = 1.02, p < .001), indicating 
that the participants derived more positive affect from exposure to the upward 
target than from exposure to the downward target (assimilative response). In 
addition, a main effect of identification was found (B = .14, p = .026), indicating 
that identification was associated with more positive affect. Unexpectedly, the 
predicted interaction between direction and degree of identification was not 
found (R²-change = .001; F < 1), but was qualified by the three-way interaction 
with SCO (R²-change = .006; F(1,187) = 3.47, p = .064). Further analyses revea-
led that only among participants high in SCO the predicted interaction between 
direction and identification was found (p = .069), and not among those low 
in SCO. Inspection of the simple slopes revealed that among those with a high 
SCO, in line with the predictions, upward identification was associated with more 
positive affect (B = .33, p = .001). However, in contrast to the predictions, iden-
tification with the downward target did not influence the affective response 
(B = .034, ns) (see Figure 2a). Among those with a low SCO, neither upward 
(B = -.006, ns) nor downward (B = .20, ns) identification influenced the amount 
of positive affect (see Figure 2b). In sum, partial support was found for our 
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hypotheses. As predicted, for those with a high SCO, upward identification was 
associated with higher levels of positive affect. Also, SCO was found to enhance 
the effect of identification with the upward target, but not of identification with 
the downward target. 
 Figure 2a.
 Positive affective response to upward and downward exposure 
 as a function of degree of identification for participants high in SCO. 
 Figure 2b.
 Positive affective response to upward and downward exposure 
 as a function of degree of identification for participants low in SCO. 
Next, two analyses were performed to test whether the identification process 
would not influence the self-evaluative responses in the same manner as the so-
cial comparison process did, and whether the social comparison process would 
not influence the affective responses in the same manner as the identification 
process did. SCO was also included as predictor.
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The affective responses to upward and downward comparison. 
Besides the main effect of direction (B = 1.02, p < .001), only a main effect of 
social comparison was found (B = -.15, p = .021), indicating that comparison was 
associated with less positive affect. Since no interaction between direction and 
social comparison was found, it can be concluded that social comparison did not 
influence the assimilative affective responses. 
The self-evaluative responses to upward and downward identification.
Besides the main effect of direction (B = -.44, p < .001), a main effect of identifi-
cation was found (B = -.15, p = .039), indicating that identification led to overall 
less positive self-evaluations. However, this effect was qualified by an, unexpec-
ted, two-way interaction between direction and identification (R²-change = .037; 
F(1,190) = 9.40, p = .002). No other two-way interaction was found (R²-change’s 
< .008; F’s <2.0, p’s > .16), however, the three-way interaction was marginally 
significant (R²-change = .011; F(1,187) = 2.85, p = .093). Further analysis showed 
that the two-way interaction between direction and identification was only sig-
nificant for those with a high SCO (p < .001), and not for those with a low SCO. 
Inspection of the simple slopes of this interaction revealed that, among those 
with a high SCO, downward identification was associated with relatively less 
positive self-evaluations (B = -.64, p < .001) while upward identification was not 
associated with changes in the self-evaluative response (B = .064, ns) (see Figure 
3a). Among those low in SCO, neither identification with the upward (B = .096, 
ns) or downward target (B = -.01, ns) influenced the self-evaluative response 
(see Figure 3b). Thus, identification also influences the self-evaluative response, 
however in opposite direction as the social comparison process: identification 
with the downward target decreased the contrastive self-evaluative response, es-
pecially for those with a high SCO. This latter finding means that SCO moderated 
the effect of downward identification on self-evaluation.
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 Figure 3a.Self-evaluative response to upward and downward exposure as a 
 function of degree of identification for participants high in SCO. 
 
 Figure 3b.Self-evaluative response to upward and downward exposure as a 
 function of degree of identification for participants low in SCO. 
  
Discussion
Using a dual-process framework, we investigated people’s responses to exposu-
re to better and worse-off others. We expected that an identification process, 
operating according to the rules of an experiential system, would underlie the 
assimilative affective responses. Also, we expected that a social comparison pro-
cess, operating according to the rules of a cognitive system, would underlie the 
contrastive self-evaluative responses. Social comparison and identification we 
thus considered being two fundamentally different kinds of processes that may 
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occur when people are exposed to others, leading to fundamentally different 
kinds of responses. In a preliminary thought listing, we found that social compa-
rison and identification were indeed naturally occurring processes when people 
are exposed to upward and downward others. Experiment 1 subsequently showed 
that these processes influence people’s affective and self-evaluative responses to 
these exposures. As predicted, the more the participants compared themselves 
with the upward target the less positive their self-evaluative response was, and 
the more they compared themselves with the downward target the more positive 
their self-evaluative response was. Furthermore, social comparison only influen-
ced the self-evaluative response, and not the affective response. The support 
concerning the role of identification was somewhat less strong. In line with our 
predictions, among those with a high SCO, identification with the upward target 
was associated with a more positive affective response. Unexpectedly, identifica-
tion with the downward target was not associated with a less positive affective 
response. Also, the influence of the identification process was not restricted to 
the affective response, as identification with the downward target decreased the 
contrastive response on self-evaluation among participants with a high SCO.
  
Other findings concerning social comparison and identification. 
Firstly, participants overall compared themselves more with the downward tar-
get and identified themselves more with the upward target. The former finding 
contradicts Festingers’ (1954) proposition that people have a drive to compare 
upward, however both findings can be interpreted in the light of people’s drive 
to facilitate pleasure and to avoid pain, or, phrased differently, as a self-defensive 
reaction. Both downward comparison and upward identification lead to positive 
outcomes, whereas upward comparison and downward identification lead to 
negative outcomes. Thus, people compared and identified themselves more with 
the targets when it led to positive outcomes and they compared and identified 
themselves less when it led to negative outcomes. Secondly, social comparison 
was associated with less positive affect, and identification was associated more 
positive affect. This finding is consistent with the findings of Clore, Schwarz, & 
Conway (1994) showing that negative affect is related to analytic processing, 
and that positive affect is related to automatic and heuristic information proces-
sing  (see also Bless & Schwarz, 1999). Thus, although the present research does 
not offer direct evidence on the nature of the comparison and the identification 
process, the way they were related to positive and negative affects suggests that 
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social comparison may indeed be a more analytic process and identification a 
more holistic process.
Social comparison orientation.
We investigated whether people with a higher SCO would respond stronger to upward 
and downward exposure. SCO was indeed associated with the participant’s res-
ponses, particularly the identification response and to a lesser degree the com-
parison response. Specifically, SCO influenced the identification process at two 
points. Firstly, a high SCO increased the degree to which people identified them-
selves with both the upward and the downward target. Secondly, SCO was asso-
ciated with the responses to upward and downward identification: particularly 
people with higher SCO derived positive affect from identifying them-selves with 
upward others, replicating the finding of a study by Brenninkmeijer (2002). Also, 
people with higher SCO, had a less positive self-evaluative response to downward 
exposure when they identified themselves with the downward target. Concer-
ning the influence of SCO on the social comparison process, SCO increased the 
degree to which participants compared themselves with both the upward and 
the downward target, confirming the validity of the scale (see also Buunk et al., 
2003; VanderZee et al., 1998b). SCO did not influence the degree to which people 
were affected by these comparisons, implying that, once people compare them-
selves with others, people high and low in SCO change their self-evaluations to 
the same extent. It thus appears that SCO particularly influenced the identifi-
cation process, a finding that is compatible with the conclusion of a study by 
Gibbons and Buunk (1999). On the basis of various relations of SCO with other 
measure they concluded that the typical comparer may be characterized as an 
individual who is interpersonal more than introspectively oriented and sensitive 
to the behavior of others. It thus appears that people with higher SCO feel more 
related to other people, and thus identify themselves more with others and are 
more sensitive to the degree to which they identify themselves with others.
 
The upward and downward target. 
Whereas the participants evaluated the downward target as being worse off, 
they did not evaluate the upward target as being better off. This is more often 
the case in the bogus-interview paradigm (e.g., Ybema, et al., 1996). We suppose 
that people may be reluctant to see the upward target as better off, because they 
were trying to avoid to pain associated with it, similar as the self-defensive pat-
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tern we found for the degree to which the participants compared and identified 
themselves with both targets. In fact, on average, participants’ self-evaluations 
were not changed after the exposure to the upward target. However, even if the 
upward target genuinely did not have a better social life than the participants, 
this did not undermine the testing of the main hypotheses, but rather offered a 
more stringent test of the hypotheses. If the upward target had been evaluated 
as better-off, the results may have been even stronger. 
Experiment 2
Whereas Experiment 1, for the most part, supported the hypotheses, the results 
only showed that degree of social comparison and identification were correlated 
with the affective and self-evaluative responses, not that they were causally rela-
ted to these responses. Therefore, in Experiment 2, degree of social comparison 
and identification were experimentally manipulated by instructing participants 
to either compare or identify themselves with the upward or downward target. 
We expected that in the comparison condition, the contrastive self-evaluative 
response would be most pronounced, and that in the identification condition 
the assimilative affective response would be most pronounced. SCO was again 
included. Finally, we used a different measure to check for the manipulation of 
direction of exposure. Asking participants to evaluate the social life of the target 
compared to their own social life, as we did in Experiment 1, in fact is a measure 
of the effect of the exposure. Therefore, we asked the participants how positi-
vely or negatively they perceived the targets to ensure that they did perceive the 
upward target as positive and the downward target as negative. 
Method
During an obligatory first-year psychology course, 153 psychology students par-
ticipated in our paper-and-pencil study. Five students were excluded from the 
data because they were 40 years or older. The average age of the resulting 148 
participants was 20 years (SD = 1.87). Participants were randomly assigned to 
one of four conditions of the 2 (direction of exposure: upward, downward) X 2 
(instruction: identification, social comparison) design. 
Social comparison and identification 
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The first part of the questionnaire consisted of demographic questions and the 
measurement of SCO using the INCOM (alpha = .84). In the second part of the 
questionnaire the participants were presented either the upward or the down-
ward bogus newspaper article. In contrast to Experiment 1, the participants were 
now explicitly instructed to either compare or to identify with the target. 
The social comparison instructions read as follows: 
When someone tells something about himself, for example, about how thing are 
going with his studies or about an experience which he had, a common reaction 
of listeners is that they compare themselves with the other. Many people start 
thinking about their own experiences when someone tells them something that 
might also happen to them.
On the next page, you will find an interview with a first-year student that appeared 
in the media last year. The section in which this person tells about his or her so-
cial life will offer people who are also first-year students many opportunities for 
comparison.
When you read this interview in a minute, compare yourself as much as possible 
with this person. 
With reference to this student’s story, think about your own social life and try to 
assess how your social life is at this moment, compared to this student.
Please take your time reading the interview. Afterwards, you may continue with 
the rest of the questionnaire. 
The identification instructions read as follows:
When someone tells something about himself, for example, about how thing are 
going with his studies or about an experience which he had, a common reaction 
of listeners is that they recognize themselves in the other. Many people realize 
that they have a lot in common with other people and that they resemble others 
in many ways. 
On the next page, you will find an interview with a first-year student that appeared 
in the media last year. The section in which this person tells about his or her so-
cial life will sound very familiar to people who are also first-year students. 
When you read this interview in a minute, pay the most attention to things you 
Questionnaire
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have in common with this person. Assume that the other is someone just like 
you. When you don’t recognize much of yourself in the other, imagine that in the 
future things might be the same for you as for this person.
Please take your time reading the interview. Afterwards, you may continue with 
the rest of the questionnaire. 
Next, the same measures were taken as in Experiment 1. The correlation between 
the positive and negative affective response was -.85 (p < .001), and they were, 
therefore, again combined into one scale with higher values indicating a more 
positive affective response. Alpha’s were .85 for the self-evaluative response 
(with , .79 for degree of identification and, .91 for degree of social comparison. 
Finally, the following question was asked: “How positive or negative is the image 
that the person in the interview portrays of his or her social life?” (1= very pos-
itive, 9 = very negative) to check for the manipulation of direction of exposure.
Results and Discussion
Manipulation check on the direction of exposure. 
A Univariate Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) revealed that the participants found 
that the upward target described his or her social life more positively (M = 2.3, 
SD = 1.39) than the downward target (M = 7.8, SD = 1.02; F(1,142) = 760.95, 
p < .001). In addition, both ratings differed significantly from 5, the scale’s neu-
tral midpoint. The upward target was evaluated as giving a positive impression 
(t(69) = -16.6,p < .001) and the downward target was evaluated as giving a 
negative impression of his or her social life (t(73) = 23.7, p < .001).
Degree of social comparison. 
Degree of social comparison was regressed on direction of exposure, instruction, 
and SCO, using the same procedures as in Experiment 1. Three main effects were 
found. Firstly, there was a main effect of direction (B = -.12, p = .082), indicating 
that, similar as in Experiment 1, participants compared themselves somewhat 
more with the downward target than with the upward target. Secondly, the pre-
dicted main effect of instruction was found, albeit rather weakly (B = .12, p  = 
.088), indicating that comparison was somewhat higher in the comparison con-
dition than in the identification condition. This main effect was qualified, how-
ever, by an interaction between direction and instruction (R²-change = .030; 
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F(1, 139) = 5.64, p = .019). Inspection of the simple slopes revealed that only 
in the downward condition comparison was higher in the comparison condition 
than in the identification condition (B = .22, p = .039) and not in the upward 
condition (B = -.081, ns). Thus, the manipulation of social comparison appeared 
to be successful in the downward condition, and not in the upward condition. 
Thirdly, the main effect of SCO was replicated (B = .38, p < .001): participants 
who were higher in SCO compared themselves more with the targets. This main 
effect was qualified, however, by an interaction between direction and SCO (R²-
change = .023; F(1, 139) = 4.34, p = .039). Inspection of the simple slopes reve-
aled that particularly in the upward condition, SCO predicted the degree of com-
parison (B = .53, p < .001), and to a lesser degree in the downward condition 
(B = .24, p =  .019). The two-way interaction between instruction and SCO was 
not significant, neither was the three-way interaction (R²-change  < .004, F < 1). 
Degree of identification. 
Similar regression analyses with degree of identification as the dependent varia-
ble revealed a main effect of direction (B = .17, p = .006). This effect indicated 
that, similar as in Experiment 1, participants identified themselves more with the 
upward than with the downward target. Secondly, the predicted main effect 
of instruction was found (B = -.15, p = .017), indicating that identification was 
higher in the identification condition than in the comparison condition. Thus, 
the manipulation of identification appeared successful. Thirdly, the main effect 
of SCO was replicated (B = .17, p < .001): participants with a higher SCO identi-
fied themselves more with the upward and downward target. Further analyses 
revealed no significant two- or three-way interactions (all R²-change ‘s < .003; 
F ‘s < 1).
 
To investigate the self-evaluative and affective responses to upward and down-
ward exposure in the comparison and identification conditions, two series of 
regression-analyses were run. First, the self-evaluative response was regressed 
on direction, instruction, and SCO, using the same procedure as above, and next 
the affective responses. These analyses showed no main or interaction effects 
involving SCO. This means that the findings of Experiment 1, showing that SCO 
enhanced the effect of upward identification on the affective response and the 
effect of downward identification on the self-evaluative response were not repli-
Main analyses
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cated. Since no effects of SCO were found, below simpler Analyses of Variance 
(ANOVA’s) are reported with only direction of exposure and instruction as inde-
pendent variables. 
Self-evaluative response. 
A 2 (direction of exposure: upward and downward) X 2 (instruction: social com-
parison and identification) ANOVA with the self-evaluative response as the de-
pendent variable revealed a main effect of direction (F(1,144) = 13.36, p < .001). 
Similar as in Experiment 1, a contrastive response was found: participants’ self-
evaluative response was more positive after the downward exposure than after 
the upward exposure (M = 5.7 vs. M = 5.1). No main effect of instruction was 
found (F(1,144) = 1.18, ns), however, the predicted interaction between direction 
and instruction was found (F(1,144) = 3.36, p = .069). Inspection of the simple 
main effects revealed that, in accordance with our hypothesis, the contrast effect 
on the self-evaluative response was only found in the comparison condition (M 
= 5.9 vs. 5.1; F(1,144) = 15.91, p < .001), and not in the identification condition 
(M = 5.5 vs. 5.2; F(1,144) = 1.58, ns) (see Figure 4). 
 Figure 4.
 Self-evaluative response to upward and downward exposure 
 in the identification condition and in the comparison condition.
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Affective response. 
A second 2 (direction of exposure: upward and downward) X 2 (instruction: so-
cial comparison and identification) ANOVA with the positive affective response 
as dependent variable revealed a significant main effect of direction (F(1,141) = 
248.43, p < .001). Similar as in Experiment 1, an assimilative response was found: 
participants experienced more positive affect after upward exposure than after 
downward exposure (M = 3.8 vs. M = 1.7). No main effect of instruction was 
found (F(1,141) = 1.28, ns), but, as predicted, the interaction between direction 
and instruction was found (F(1,141) = 4.92, p = .028). Inspection of the simple 
main effects revealed that, in accordance with our hypothesis, the assimilation 
effect on the affective response was more pronounced in the identification con-
dition (M = 4.1 vs. M = 1.7; F(1,141) = 151.24, p < .001) than in the comparison 
condition (M = 3.6 vs. M = 1.8; F(1,141) = 98.48, p < .001) (see Figure 5). 
 Figure 5.
 Positive affective response to upward and downward exposure
 in the identification condition and in the comparison condition. 
In sum, Experiment 2 replicated and extended the findings of Experiment 1. As 
predicted, the contrastive self-evaluative response was most pronounced in the 
comparison condition whereas the assimilative affective response was most pro-
nounced in the identification condition. However, whereas in Experiment 1 the 
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results concerning the affective responses to upward identification were relati-
vely weak, in Experiment 2, the results concerning the self-evaluative responses 
were only marginally significant. Combined however, the findings in general sup-
port the hypotheses that identification underlies the affective responses to expo-
sure to an upward or downward target and that social comparison underlies the 
self-evaluative responses, and that the two are thus two qualitatively different 
kinds of processes, leading to qualitatively different kinds of responses. 
It must be noted that the manipulation of social comparison was only partially 
successful. Whereas the comparison instruction successfully increased the degree 
of comparison with the downward target, it did not increase comparison with 
the upward target. We suppose that this may again be an indication of a self-
defensive reaction. Would the instruction have successfully increased the degree 
of social comparison with the upward target, it might have led to a negative self-
evaluative response. After all, Experiment 1 had shown that upward comparison 
was associated with a less positive self-evaluative response. Now the self-evalu-
ative response was practically unchanged. In a similar vein, participants again 
compared themselves somewhat more with the downward target and identified 
themselves more with the upward target, replicating the self-defensive pattern of 
Experiment 1. Finally, similar as in Experiment 1, SCO was found to increase both 
the degree of comparison and degree of identification with the targets. Howe-
ver, the finding that SCO moderated the effect of upward identification on the 
affective response and the effect of downward identification on the self-evalua-
tive response was not replicated. A possible explanation is that the identification 
process is different when one is instructed to identify oneself than when it spon-
taneously occurs. After all, identification we assumed to operate according to the 
rules of the experiential system, implying, among other things, that identification 
is a spontaneous process. Finally, whereas in Experiment 1, the participants did 
not evaluate the upward target as being better off, they did find that the upward 
target gives a positive impression, just as the downward target gives a negative 
impression. Thus, whereas the present findings may not apply to exposure to an 
upward target they do apply to exposure to others who are doing well. 
General discussion
In the present study, we took a dual-process perspective (Epstein & Pacini, 1999; 
Epstein, 2003) in investigating people’s responses to exposure to others who 
are better or worse off. We distinguished between a social comparison process 
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that we assumed to operate according to the rules of a cognitive system and an 
identification process that we assumed to operate according to the rules of an 
experiential system. More specifically, we predicted that the social comparison 
process, in which both similarities and differences between the self and the other 
are systematically assessed, would lead to a contrastive self-evaluative response. 
In addition, we predicted that the identification process, in which one perceives 
the other holistically and feels a bond with the other person, would lead to an 
assimilative global affective response. Social comparison and identification we 
thus considered being two fundamentally different kinds of processes that may 
occur when people are exposed to others, leading to fundamentally different 
kinds of responses. 
In both a correlational and an experimental experiment, these hypotheses were 
in general supported. Comparing oneself with the lonely and unhappy student 
increased satisfaction with one’s own social life, while, simultaneously, identifi-
cation with this student evoked a negative affective response. Comparing one-
self with the happy and socially active student decreased satisfaction with one’s 
own social life, whereas identifying oneself with this student evoked a positive 
affective response. Thus, as expected, the social comparison and identification 
processes appeared to influence different kinds of responses in opposite direc-
tions. Noteworthy, although the participants in Experiment 2 were literally in-
structed to compare themselves, not to contrast themselves, it appeared that 
this instruction led to contrastive responses on self-evaluation. This finding is 
similar to that of Martin and Gentry (1997) and Cattarin, Thompson, Thomas, 
and Williams (2000) who found that when females were instructed to compare 
themselves with attractive models in ads or commercials, the self-perceptions of 
their own appearance were lowered. Our finding that identification is associated 
with assimilative responses is in line with the research of several other researchers 
(Brenninkmeijer, 2002; Buunk, et al, 2001b; Buunk, et al., 2001c; Ybema & Buunk, 
1995; Ybema, et al., 1996). Moreover, the present study demonstrates that the 
assimilative effects of identification are limited to global affective responses and 
do not apply to the self-evaluative responses. 
Social comparison orientation. 
Individual differences in social comparison orientation proved to be an impor-
tant factor in determining people’s responses to exposure to upward and down-
ward others. Firstly, SCO enhanced the processing of the information about the 
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targets. People with a high SCO both compared and identified themselves more 
with the upward and the downward target. Secondly, SCO enhanced the effects 
of spontaneous identification with the targets: particularly people with a high 
SCO derived positive affect from identifying themselves with the upward target 
(see also Brenninkmeijer, 2002). 
Limitations. 
First, although the upward target was rated as giving a positive impression of his 
or her social life, the participants did not evaluate the target as being better off. 
Therefore, strictly speaking, the present findings do not apply to exposure to bet-
ter-off others but to exposure to well-off others. It remains an empirical question 
whether the affective and particularly the self-evaluative responses would have 
been stronger if the target was actually upward, as we would predict. Second, 
we supposed that people may have responded often in a self-defensive fashion 
(for similar findings see Stapel & Koomen, 2001). Since this is an ad hoc explana-
tion, it should be investigated directly in future research. Third, one may argue 
that the dependent variables could be susceptible to demand characteristics. 
That is, because the questions assessing the responses to upward and downward 
exposure directly referred to the targets, one may argue that participants may try 
to guess the researcher’s interest and adjust their answers accordingly. However, 
we believe that a demand characteristic explanation is not possible, as it can not 
account for the complexity of the results. A demand characteristic explanation, 
for example, cannot explain why, in Experiment 1, only high-SCO individuals re-
ported affective responses to identifying with the upward target. In addition, 
if a demand characteristic explanation were correct, we would expect that in 
Experiment 2, the self-evaluative responses following the comparison or identifi-
cation instruction would also differ in the upward condition and not only in the 
downward condition.
Conclusions. 
Applying a dual-process perspective to the study of responses to upward and 
downward exposure proved to be fruitful. Affective and self-evaluative responses 
appear to be caused by two fundamentally different processes. Furthermore, de-
pending on what kinds of responses are considered, people may respond either 
positively or negatively to exposure to others. A practical implication may be that 
people can be learned to focus on the positive responses of exposure to others 
who are better or worse-off, by learning them to compare downward to identify 
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upward. Future research may be aimed at studying more directly the analytic na-
ture of the social comparison and the holistic nature of the identification process, 
and at studying possible interactions between both processes. 
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Affective and self-evaluative responses 
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Abstract - In the present study (n =  96), the interplay between affective and self-evaluative reac-
tions to exposure to others who are either better off or worse off was investigated. It was assumed 
that affective reactions are primary and that self-evaluative reactions are secondary. Therefore, it 
was predicted that the strongest effects on both mood and self-evaluation would be found when 
mood was assessed first and self-evaluation next. In line with this prediction, affective effects were 
found only when they were measured first, and not when they were measured after self-evalua-
tion. However, the effects on self-evaluation were the same whether they were measured first or 
last. Furthermore, individual differences in social comparison orientation were found to enhance 
self-evaluative reactions, but not affective reactions. We concluded that affective and self-evalua-
tive reactions to exposure to others who are better-off or worse-off are qualitatively different and 
cannot be considered interchangeably. 
We live in a social world. This means, among other things, that we are often in-
formed about the ups and downs of other people, not only of people whom we 
know personally, but also of celebrities or of ‘ordinary people’ whose stories are, 
for example, depicted in magazine articles. Because we are social creatures, these 
stories and encounters may affect us. Learning about the positive or negative ex-
periences of others may, on the one hand, affect our mood, by evoking either 
a positive or a negative feeling. On the other hand, our views of ourselves may 
alter, because we may compare ourselves with the other. Within social psychol-
ogy, numerous studies have been conducted that showed that people’s affect 
and self-evaluation may be influenced by others. For example, Morse & Gergen 
(1970) showed that the actual presence of someone else, who appears either to 
be superior or inferior, might influence a person’s self-esteem. Job applicants 
who encountered another applicant who appeared to be well mannered and 
professional experienced a decrease in self-esteem, while those who encoun-
tered a dishevelled and slovenly appearing applicant experienced a self-esteem 
increase. In addition, thinking about or imagining others who are worse-off has 
been suggested as a coping mechanism when one’s self-esteem is threatened 
(Wills, 1981). Indeed, Wood, Taylor, and Lichtman (1985) showed that women 
suffering from breast cancer often compared themselves mentally with worse-
off cancer patients. More recently, research has shown that written accounts of 
others who are either more or less fortunate can also influence people’s mood 
and self-evaluation. It must be noted, however, that in most studies in which the 
responses of people to better-off or worse-off others were investigated, either 
only the affective or only the self-evaluative reactions were considered (for some 
exceptions see Bui & Pelham, 1999; Buunk & Ybema, 2003; Stapel & Koomen, 
This chapter is based on: Groothof, H.A.K., Buunk, A.P., & Siero, F.W. (2003). Affective and self-evaluative re-
sponses to exposure to others: Investigation of an order effect. Manuscript submitted for publication.
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2000). Yet, research including both kinds of reactions seems important, as they 
both may have distinct qualities, and they may influence each other. 
The primacy-of-affect theory. 
In 1980, Zajonc presented his theory of affective primacy, which holds that af-
fective reactions are basic, automatic, and autonomous, occurring prior to and 
separate from cognitive responses. Several studies support the hypothesis that 
affective reactions are prior to and occur separately from nonaffective reactions 
(see Zajonc 1980, 1998). For example, research by Stapel, Koomen, and Ruys 
(2002) showed that affective information is detected earlier than nonaffective in-
formation, although it was a matter of fractions of seconds. We applied the idea 
of affective primacy to our research question and assumed that, when people are 
exposed to a better-off (upward) or worse-off (downward) other, they initially 
experience a shift in their affective state and that only subsequently do people 
infer implications for their self-evaluation. Thus, we assumed the affective reac-
tion to be primary and the cognitive, self-evaluative reaction to be secondary. 
The implication of this assumption is that the order in which affective and self-
evaluative reactions are assessed may be important. First assessing individuals’ 
mood states and then their self-evaluations follows the sequence of individu-
als’ experiences most directly, whereas measuring first self-evaluations and then 
mood states may interfere with this ‘natural’ sequence. When mood is assessed 
first, the individuals’ attention is directed to something that they are experiencing 
at that very moment. The following question about their self-evaluation may 
subsequently also be easier to answer, because people may base their answers 
on their previously reported mood states. As Schwarz’s mood-as-information 
model (Schwarz, 2001) explains, when asked to evaluate a certain target, people 
may ask themselves “How do I feel about it?”. Thus, first assessing mood and 
then self-evaluation, instead of first assessing self-evaluation and then mood, we 
propose, represents a situation in which the effects of exposure to an upward 
or downward target can be measured without interference between mood and 
self-evaluation and will, therefore, offer the strongest effects on both mood and 
self-evaluation.
When individuals are first asked about their self-evaluations and then about their 
mood states, the ordering of the questions will interfere with the sequence of 
their experiences. We expected that particularly the assessment of mood might 
be impeded by this interference. The question assessing self-evaluation causes 
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considerable reflection. Zajonc (1980) stated that “Preferences need no infer-
ences” but we propose that preferences may even be obscured by too many 
inferences. When feelings are given too much thought, we propose, the experi-
ence of a feeling or emotion may become more difficult to retrieve. Therefore, 
we expected to find an effect of upward and downward exposure on individuals’ 
moods only when it was assessed before and not when it was assessed after the 
self-evaluation measurement. This line of reasoning is similar to that of Wilson, 
Dunn, Kraft, and Lisle (1989), who reviewed studies showing that asking people 
to explain their preferences leads to a lower correspondence between their pref-
erences and their subsequent behaviour. In one experiment, for example (Wilson, 
Dunn, Bybee, Hyman, & Rotondo, 1984), participants were given the opportunity 
to play with 5 different kinds of puzzles. For those who had to explain why they 
preferred one puzzle to another, there was a sharp reduction in consistency be-
tween their reported preferences and the puzzles they eventually played with. In 
addition, Swann, Griffin, Predmore, and Gaines (1987) report results that are in 
line with our hypothesis. Participants received either favourable or unfavourable 
social feedback after which their affective and cognitive reactions were mea-
sured. In line with our hypothesis, affective reactions were only found when they 
were measured before the cognitive reactions and not when they were measured 
afterwards. We expected that the assessment of self-evaluation would not be 
impeded when it was measured before, in stead of after, mood. As the earlier 
described ‘mood-as-information effect’ would not now occur, we predicted that 
the self-evaluative reaction may be somewhat weaker when it is measured be-
fore instead of after mood. 
Effects on mood and self-evaluation. 
Concerning the specific effects on mood and self-evaluation, we predicted that 
individuals would experience more positive moods and feel better about them-
selves after exposure to a downward target rather than after exposure to an 
upward target. Thus, on both affect and self-evaluation we predicted a contrast 
effect. We predicted this because we assumed that, when people are exposed 
to a description of an upward or downward other, they compare themselves 
with this person, using the other person as a reference point to evaluate them-
selves against. Research has shown that this process is most likely to result in 
contrastive effects (Chapter 1; Mussweiler, 2001). It must be noted that assim-
ilation effects of exposure to an upward or downward target are sometimes 
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found, mainly on affect (e.g. Bui & Pelham, 1999; Buunk, VanderZee, & VanY-
peren, 2001b; Buunk, Ybema, Gibbons, & Ipenburg, 2001c; Chapter 1; VanderZee, 
Buunk & Sanderman, 1998a; Ybema & Buunk, 1995). However, in these studies, 
a different affect measure was used than in the present study. In the studies in 
which assimilative effects on affect were reported, the participants were either 
asked to indicate what they had felt ‘while reading the information about the 
upward or downward target’ or ‘to what extent the target information aroused 
certain feelings’. Both formulations refer to the target. However, in studies in 
which a contrast effect on affect was reported (e.g. Gibbons, 1986; Gibbons & 
Boney McCoy, 1991), participants were asked to indicate their moods on a scale, 
without referring to the target. It might be that this difference in measurement 
causes the conflicting findings. Perhaps, when a reference to the target is made, 
an identification process is induced, which seems to be related to assimilative ef-
fects of exposure to an upward or downward target (e.g. Brenninkmeijer, 2002; 
Buunk, et al., 2001b; Buunk, et al., 2001c; Chapter 1; Ybema & Buunk, 1995). In 
sum, within the present paradigm, a contrast effect was expected on both affect 
and self-evaluation. 
Social Comparison Orientation. 
Individual differences in interest in social comparison are also an important fac-
tor in determining the reactions to exposure to an upward or a downward target. 
Recently, Gibbons and Buunk (1999) developed a measure for these individual 
differences in social comparison orientation (SCO). Several effects of SCO have 
been reported. Firstly, it has been shown that SCO is a good predictor of inter-
est in social comparison information. In a study by VanderZee, Oldersma, Buunk, 
and Bos (1998b), for example, cancer patients were given the opportunity to 
read short interviews with fellow patients about their experiences. It was found 
that participants who had higher SCO read more interviews (see also Gibbons 
& Buunk, 1999). Secondly, SCO has been found to enhance the effects of up-
ward and downward exposure (e.g., Brenninkmeijer, 2002; Buunk et al., 2001c). 
For example, Buunk, Oldersma, and DeDreu (2001a) found that, especially for 
high-SCO individuals, downward comparison was a successful way to enhance 
satisfaction with one’s relationship. Thus, on the one hand, SCO has been shown 
to increase people’s interest in social comparison and, on the other hand, it has 
been shown to enhance people’s reactions to upward and downward compari-
son. Thus, SCO seems to work as a magnifier. Therefore, we predicted that the 
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hypothesised effects would be found particularly for participants who were high 
in SCO. Thus, firstly, we expected that SCO would enhance the expected contrast 
effects on mood and self-evaluation. Secondly, we expected that, especially for 
those high in SCO, the order of assessment of mood and self-evaluation would 
be important. We expected that those high in SCO would think more about 
the exposure. As we explained above, contemplation may make it more difficult 
to retrieve one’s affective reactions. Therefore, we expected that, especially for 
people high in SCO, affective reactions would only be found when they were 
measured before instead of after the self-evaluation measurement. 
Method
One-hundred-and-three students participated in our paper-and-pencil study dur-
ing obligatory first-year medicine class-meetings. Seven participants were ex-
cluded, because their responses to the mood or self-evaluation measures were 
extreme (> 2 SD above or below the mean). The average age of the 96 partici-
pants was nearly 20 years (SD = 1.55). The participants were randomly assigned 
to one of four conditions of the 2 (direction of exposure: upward, downward) X 
2 (order: affect - self-evaluation, self-evaluation - affect) design.
To separate the measurement of the moderating variables from the experimen-
tal part, the questionnaire was presented as if it contained two independent stud-
ies. The first study was called ‘Personality and Study’ and the second study was 
called “Perception of articles in the media’. The first part of the questionnaire 
consisted of demographic questions and individual difference measures. The sec-
ond part of the questionnaire contained the bogus interview and the dependent 
measures. 
Social comparison orientation. 
Individual differences in social comparison orientation were measured using the 
Iowa-Netherlands Comparison Orientation Measure (Gibbons & Buunk, 1999). 
This scale consists of 11 items such as “I always pay a lot of attention to how I do 
things compared with how others do things” and “I never consider my situation 
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in life relative to that of other people” (reversed). The items were measured us-
ing 5-point scales (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). Cronbach’s alpha 
was .83. 
Interview fragment. 
The participants were exposed to a bogus interview with a first-year student 
who tells about his or her experiences in forming friendships and building up a 
new social network, which is an important subject to first-year students. Based 
on in-depth interviews with first-year students, two interview fragments were 
written, an upward version and a downward version. In the upward version, the 
student is very positive about his or her social life (the sex of the target was not 
decided). The student has become acquainted with many fellow-students, has 
formed good friendships with some of them, gets along with roommates, and 
can always find someone to have fun with or to have a good conversation with. 
In the downward version, the student is rather negative about his or her social 
life. The student has no real friends and tells of standing alone during breaks 
at college, having hardly any contact with roommates, and being alone often, 
watching TV, or studying. We made the interviews as realistic as possible by giv-
ing them a newspaper-article layout. 
Dependent variables.
Mood and self-evaluation were the main dependent variables and were assessed 
directly after the exposure, before any other measurement was taken. The order 
in which these two variables were assessed was randomly varied. Mood was 
measured using two questions; “How positive is your mood at this moment” 
and “How negative is your mood at this moment?”. Answers were given on a 5-
point scale (1 = not or hardly, 5 = extremely). Because the correlation between 
the two items was - .34 (p = .001), both items were combined into one scale (2). 
Self-evaluations of the participants’ own social lives were measured using 4 items 
(alpha = .65). “How satisfied are you at this moment with your own social life?”, 
“How certain are you at this moment about your social life?”, “How lonely do you 
feel at this moment?” (reversed), and “How concerned are you at this moment 
about your social life? (reversed)”. Answers were given on a 5-point scale (1 = 
not or hardly, 5 = extremely). To measure the successfulness of the manipulation 
of the direction of exposure, two questions were asked. First, the participants 
were asked to indicate on a 9-point scale how positively or negatively they felt 
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that the target portrayed his or her social life (1= very negatively, 5 = not nega-
tively, not positively, 9 = very positively). Secondly, the participants were asked 
how they perceived the target’s social life in comparison with their own social 
lives (1 = much worse, 5 = about the same, and 9 = much better) in order to 
determine whether the upward target was really evaluated as being better-off 
and whether the downward target was really evaluated as being worse-off.
Results
Ratings of the target and manipulation check. 
A Univariate Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) revealed that the participants found 
that the upward target gave a much more positive description of his or her social 
life than the downward target did (Mupward = 8.2, SD = 1.35 vs. Mdownward = 2.4, 
SD = 1.32; F(1,95) = 446.56, p < .001). Furthermore, both ratings differed sig-
nificantly from 5, the scale’s neutral midpoint ( tdownward (28) = -14.05, p < .001; 
tupward (47) = 16.11, p < .001). A second ANOVA revealed that, compared to the 
upward condition, the participants in the downward condition rated the target 
as worse-off relative to themselves (Mdownward = 2.2, SD = 1.49 vs. Mupward = 5.4, 
SD = 1.08; F(1,89) = 132.53, p < .001). Moreover, both ratings differed signifi-
cantly from 5, the point at which the target’s social life is evaluated as equally 
good as one’s own (tupward (45) = 2.45, p < .01, 1-tailed; tdownward  (44) = -12.37, 
p < .001, 1-tailed), although it must be noted that the difference for the upward 
target was larger than for the downward target. This is more often the case in 
research using this paradigm (e.g. Ybema, Buunk, & Heesink, 1996). People find 
it harder to acknowledge that a person is better off than himself or herself than 
to acknowledge that a person is worse off. Thus, the participants found that 
the upward target gave a positive description of his or her social life, and they 
evaluated the target as better-off than themselves. In addition, the participants 
found that the downward target gave a negative description of his or her social 
life, and evaluated the target as worse-off  than themselves. The manipulation of 
direction of exposure can be considered successful. 
 
In order to test the hypotheses concerning mood and self-evaluation, regression 
analyses were conducted in which mood or self-evaluation was the dependent 
variable. Direction of exposure, order, and SCO, which is a continuous variable, 
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were the independent variables. In the first step of the analyses, the main effects 
were entered. Next, three regressions were run in which each of the three two-
way interactions was entered, in order to investigate whether each interaction 
significantly contributed to the prediction of the dependent variable. In the last 
step, when all two-way interactions were added, the three-way interaction was 
added. Following Aiken and West (1991), the continuous independent variable 
was standardised and the B-values are reported instead of the ß-values. 
Mood. 
In the regression analyses, no main or interaction effects of SCO were found. 
Therefore, a simpler model was tested using a 2 (direction of exposure: upward, 
downward) X 2 (order: mood - self-evaluation, self-evaluation - mood) Univariate 
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA). Neither the main effect of direction of exposure 
(F(1,92) = 1.38, ns), nor the main effect of order (F < 1) was significant. However, 
as expected, the interaction between direction and order was significant (F(1,92) 
= 7.67, p < .01). Inspection of the simple main effects revealed that, as expected, 
only in the Mood – Self-evaluation condition was a significant effect of direction 
of exposure found (Mupward = 3.7 vs. Mdownward = 4.1, F(1,92) = 8.12, p < .01), and 
not in the Self-evaluation – Mood condition (Mupward = 4.0 vs. Mdownward = 3.9, 
F(1,92) = 1.22, ns). The means are depicted in Figure 1. In the Mood – Self-evalu-
ation condition, the predicted contrast effect was found: positive mood was 
higher after downward exposure than after upward exposure. Thus, convincing 
support was found for the prediction that order is important for the assessment 
of mood: the predicted contrast effect was only found when mood was assessed 
first and not when self-evaluations were assessed first. Unexpectedly, SCO did 
not enhance the contrast effect of exposure nor enhance the effect of order of 
measurement.
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 Figure 1. 
 Positive mood after upward and downward exposure in the mood – self-evaluation 
 condition and the self-evaluation – mood condition. 
Self-evaluation. 
In the regression analyses, a main effect of direction of exposure was found 
(B = -.18, p < .001), indicating that self-evaluations were higher following down-
ward exposure than following upward exposure. Thus, the predicted contrast ef-
fect on self-evaluation was found. This contrast effect was independent of order, 
because the two-way interaction between direction and order was not signifi-
cant (R²-change = .001; F < 1). Thus, the contrast effect on self-evaluation was 
found when self-evaluation was assessed before and after the mood assessment. 
This means that no support was found for our prediction that the contrast effect 
on self-evaluation would be enhanced by first assessing mood. The means are 
depicted in Figure 2. Further regressions revealed a marginally significant main 
effect of SCO (B = -.077, p < .10), which was qualified by a significant interaction 
between direction and SCO (R²-change  = .046; F(1,91) = 5.65, p < .05). Simple 
slope analyses revealed that the main effect of direction was only significant for 
those high in SCO (1 SD above average; B = -.28, p < .001), and not for those 
low in SCO (1 SD below average; B = -.074, ns). Thus, as can be seen in Figure 
3, in which the means are depicted, the contrast effect on self-evaluation was 
only found for those high in SCO. No other two-way interaction was significant; 
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neither was the three-way interaction (all F’s < 1). In sum, the expected contrast 
effect on self-evaluation was found, and this contrast effect was, unexpectedly, 
not enhanced when mood was assessed first. In addition, consistent with our hy-
pothesis, SCO enhanced the contrast effect of upward and downward exposure 
on self-evaluation. 
 Figure 2.
 Self-evaluation after upward and downward exposure in the mood – self-evaluation 
 condition and  the self-evaluation – mood condition.
 Figure 3. 
 Self-evaluation after upward and downward exposure for those high and low in 
 social comparison orientation. 
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Discussion
In the present study, it was assumed that exposure to an upward or a downward 
target would initially evoke a certain mood state, and that people would subse-
quently experience changes in their self-evaluation. It was, therefore, predicted 
that the order in which the affective and self-evaluative reactions are assessed 
would be important. More specifically, the strongest contrast effects on mood 
and self-evaluation were expected when mood was assessed first and self-evalu-
ation next. It was predicted that the assessment of mood would be impeded 
when self-evaluations were assessed first, because the thinking about the self-
evaluative consequences was expected to make it difficult for participants to 
retrieve their affective reactions. In addition, it was predicted that a stronger 
contrast effect on self-evaluation would be found when self-evaluation was measured 
after mood, because people might base their answers on their previously re-
ported moods. Partial support was found for these predictions. As predicted, a 
contrast effect on mood was found only when mood was assessed directly after 
the exposure, and not when self-evaluation was assessed first. Thus, strong sup-
port was found for the prediction that order is important for the assessment of 
affective reactions and that first assessing a cognitive measure interferes with 
the assessment of mood. This result is in line with our assumption that, when 
people are exposed to an upward or a downward target, they first experience an 
affective reaction and only later a cognitive, self-evaluative reaction. In addition, 
it seemed that too much cognitive elaboration can make it difficult for people 
to retrieve their affective reactions. However, the present research does not of-
fer unequivocal evidence that mood effects disappear after too much cognitive 
elaboration has taken place. An alternative explanation for not finding affective 
reactions when they are measured after the self-evaluation measurement is that 
this is a time effect. Because moods are transient, the time that was needed for 
answering the self-evaluation question may have led to the disappearance of 
the mood effect (see also Swann et al., 1987). In addition, it could be that mood 
effects are not found when they are measured after self-evaluative effects, be-
cause affective reactions occur more automatically than cognitive reactions and 
are therefor more easily disrupted (e.g., Zajonc, 1980; Epstein & Pacini, 1999). 
Additional research is needed to investigate these alternative explanations. No 
support was found for the prediction that the contrast effect on self-evaluation 
would be stronger when self-evaluation was measured after, instead of before, 
mood. Thus, order of measurement was not important for the assessment of 
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self-evaluation. However, it may have been easier for participants to report their 
self-evaluations after their moods had been made accessible. That is, perhaps 
participants were only faster in reporting their self-evaluations, as the first step 
in the mental process had already been taken by making their moods accessible. 
Measuring response latencies in future research may shed some light on this is-
sue.
Social comparison orientation. 
Individual differences in social comparison orientation were expected to work 
as a magnifier. Firstly, it was predicted that the contrast effects on mood and 
self-evaluation would be enhanced by SCO. Partial support was found for this 
prediction as SCO was found to enhance the contrast effect on self-evaluation. 
The higher participants were in SCO, the more their self-evaluations were af-
fected by the exposure to the upward or the downward target. However, in 
contrast to the results of Brenninkmeijer (2002) and Buunk et al. (2001c), the 
effect on mood was not enhanced by SCO in our study. This might be explained 
by the fact that Brenninkmeijer and Buunk et al. referred to the target when they 
asked participants about their affective reactions, whereas we asked participants 
to report their moods without referring to the target. As outlined above, we 
think that these measures may assess somewhat different reactions. The finding 
that the self-evaluative, but not the affective, consequences were enhanced by 
SCO, seems to imply that affective and self-evaluative reactions have different 
qualities, as both are differentially influenced by SCO. Secondly, it was predicted 
that, especially for high-SCO individuals, affective reactions would only be found 
when they were measured first, because high-SCO individuals were expected to 
think more about self-evaluative consequences, which may make it more difficult 
to retrieve an affective reaction. However, no support was found for this predic-
tion. 
Implications and conclusions. 
The results of our research suggest that the affective and the self-evaluative re-
actions to exposure to better- or worse-off others may display different quali-
ties. Firstly, the order in which affective and self-evaluative reactions are mea-
sured proved to be important for affective reactions but not for self-evaluative 
reactions. Secondly, these data seem to imply that affective reactions to social 
comparison are more primary than cognitive reactions. However, alternative 
explanations for not finding affective reactions when they are measured after 
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self-evaluation need to be further investigated. Thirdly, individual differences in 
social comparison orientation seem to influence the degree to which people’s 
self-evaluations are affected by exposure to an upward or a downward target, 
but not their affective reactions. Yet, both kinds of reactions were in the same di-
rection as, overall, downward exposure evoked a more positive mood and a more 
positive self-evaluation than upward exposure. Thus, at least with the measures 
used in the present study, affective and cognitive measures lead to similar con-
clusions about how people are affected by upward and downward exposure. 
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Chapter 4
Abstract - In this chapter we present a study of the influence of individual differences in social com-
parison orientation (SCO) on the affective responses of exposure to better- and worse-off others. 
We tested the hypothesis that people with a high SCO identify themselves more with downward 
and upward others and will, therefore, be in a more negative mood after downward exposure 
and in a more positive mood after upward exposure, than those with a low SCO. In addition, we 
expected that people’s low levels of well-being, loneliness in this research, would moderate these 
effects. The results concerning upward exposure were not in accordance with our hypotheses, or 
other existing evidence, and some directions for further research are suggested. In contrast, the 
results concerning exposure to a downward target, were largely in line with our predictions as we 
found that people who were high in both SCO and loneliness were in the least positive mood after 
downward exposure. In addition, applying a bootstrap technique to test for mediation, we found 
indications that the less positive reactions of individuals high in SCO to downward exposure may be 
partially attributed to their heightened identification with downward others. 
How do people feel when they see that someone else is doing worse than they 
are? And how do they feel when they learn about someone else who is doing 
better? In the research into such issues of social comparison, it was originally 
assumed that merely the direction of the comparison, that is, whether one is 
comparing oneself with a better performing or upward other or whether one 
is comparing oneself with a worse performing or downward other, would de-
termine whether the comparison would evoke either more positive or negative 
feeling (cf. Hakmiller, 1966; Wills, 1981). However, considerable research has now 
demonstrated that either direction has its ups and downs (e.g., Buunk, Collins, 
Taylor, VanYperen, & Dakof, 1990). Several researchers have identified a number 
of factors that moderate how people react to social comparison, for example, 
the perceived vulnerability to the fate of the comparison other (e.g., Lockwood, 
2003), the personal importance of the comparison dimension (e.g., Tesser, 1988), 
the distinctness of others and the mutability of selves (Stapel & Koomen, 2000), 
or psychological closeness (e.g., Pelham & Wachsmuth, 1995), and the well-being 
of the comparer (e.g., Buunk, Ybema, Gibbons, & Ipenburg, 2001c; VanderZee, 
Buunk, & Sanderman, 1998a). In this study, we investigated people’s reactions 
to comparison with an upward or downward target as a function of their dispo-
sitional inclination to compare their characteristics with others and as a function 
of their level of low well-being, loneliness in the present research.
This chapter is based on: Groothof, H.A.K., Siero, F.W., & Buunk, A.P. (2003). The Influence of Individual Differ-
ences in Social Comparison Orientation on Reactions to Upward and Downward Comparisons. Manuscript submit-
ted for publication. 
66
Social comparison orientation and Identification
Social comparison orientation. 
Not all people are to the same degree interested in comparing their own qualities 
and characteristics with those of others, and not everyone is to the same degree 
affected by observing that others are doing better or worse. In 1999, Gibbons 
and Buunk acknowledged these individual differences in social comparison and 
developed a scale for measuring them, the Iowa-Netherlands Comparison Orien-
tation Measure (INCOM). This scale is used to measure the general tendency to 
compare oneself with others, and to base the evaluation of one’s own qualities 
and characteristics upon comparison with others. People who score high on this 
scale of Social Comparison Orientation (SCO) tend to focus on how they are do-
ing in comparison with others, and on how the experiences of others relate to 
themselves. Several studies have been conducted that included SCO and have 
shown that, in general, both people’s interest in and their to reactions social 
comparison are enhanced by SCO. For example, VanderZee, Oldersma, Buunk, 
and Bos (1998b) offered cancer patients the opportunity to read short interviews 
with fellow patients about their experiences, and found that participants with 
higher SCO read more interviews. In addition, in a longitudinal study among 
nurses by Buunk, Zurriaga, Gonzalez-Roma, and Subirats (2003), it was found 
that those high in SCO indicated that they more frequently compared themselves 
with colleagues who were doing better or worse. In addition, this study showed 
that individuals high in SCO were more affected by engaging in social compari-
son, as, particularly for them, social comparison increased the perception of rela-
tive deprivation nine to ten months later (see also Brenninkmeijer, 2002; Buunk 
et al., 2001c; Buunk, Oldersma, and DeDreu, 2001a; VanderZee et al., 1998b for 
data showing that individuals high in SCO are more affected by social compari-
son and Gibbons & Buunk, 1999 for data showing that individuals high in SCO 
compare themselves more with others). However, the precise influence of SCO is 
not yet fully understood, as the results do not unequivocally show under what 
conditions people high in SCO are either more positively or more negatively af-
fected by upward and downward comparison. These inconsistent findings may 
partly be explained by the fact that very diverse types of social comparison were 
investigated. In the study by Buunk et al. (2003), for example, the participants 
were retrospectively asked about their comparisons with colleagues, whereas in 
the study by Buunk et al. (2001a), downward comparison was installed by asking 
participants to generate features of their relationship in which they considered 
their relationship as better than that of most others. However, also within a 
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single paradigm, the results are not clear-cut. Therefore, we consider it necessary 
to investigate the mechanisms through which individual differences in SCO influ-
ence people’s reactions to social comparison. 
Social comparison orientation and Identification.
 In the present research, we exposed people to a description of an upward or 
downward comparison other. We tested the hypothesis that people who are 
higher in SCO are more inclined to identify themselves with upward and down-
ward others, and will, therefore, be in a more positive mood after exposure to 
an upward target and in a more negative mood after exposure to a downward 
target. People with a higher SCO are more interested in comparing their quali-
ties and characteristics with those of others and do so more often than people 
with a lower SCO. Apparently, individuals with higher SCO more often consider 
others to be suitable comparison others. Suitable usually means more similar. As 
Festinger (1954) already noted, making a comparison between oneself and an-
other person requires that the other person is not too divergent from oneself. In 
addition, Mussweiler (2003) argued that, in most comparison situations, people 
are likely to initially focus on fundamental ways in which the target and the stan-
dard are similar. Therefore, we assumed that individuals high in SCO, in general, 
are more inclined to regard others as similar to themselves, or in other words, to 
identify themselves with others. Identification is the process of recognizing one’s 
own situation in the other and feeling one with the other person (see also Ybema, 
Buunk, & Heesink, 1996). Identification is sometimes used as an explanatory 
process for understanding the assimilative effects of social comparison. That is, 
upward comparison may evoke positive reactions because people identify them-
selves with the upward target, and downward comparison may evoke negative 
reactions because people identify themselves with the downward target (e.g., 
Brenninkmeijer 2002; Buunk et al., 2001a; Buunk et al., 2001c; Ybema & Buunk, 
1995; Ybema et al., 1996). In fact, in a number of studies, the less favorable re-
sponses to social comparisons of people who were low in subjective well-being, 
could be attributed to their heightened identification with downward others 
and lessened identification with upward others (Brenninkmeijer, 2002; Ybema & 
Buunk, 1995; Ybema et al., 1996). In addition, a study by Groothof, Buunk, and 
Siero (2003a) clearly showed, using both correlational and experimental data, 
that the more people identified themselves with a target, the more positive their 
reactions were after upward exposure and the more negative after downward 
exposure (see Chapter 1).
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Social comparison orientation and low subjective well-being. 
The results of several studies indicate that the effects of SCO depend on people’s 
subjective well-being, or the lack thereof, such as how burnt-out or neurotic a 
person is. The general finding seems to be that people who are both high in 
SCO and low in well-being respond more negatively to social comparison. For 
example, in a study among sociotherapists (Buunk et al., 2001c), it was found 
that individuals high in SCO experienced more negative affect in response to 
downward exposure than individuals low in SCO, when they were also high in 
burnout. In addition, Brenninkmeijer (2002) found that teachers high in burnout 
experienced less positive affect following comparison with an upward target, 
particularly when they were high in SCO (see also VanderZee et al., 1998b). In the 
present study, we investigated whether people’s levels of loneliness would mod-
erate the effect of SCO on upward and downward identification, and, therefore, 
on people’s moods after upward and downward exposure. 
We predicted that individuals high in SCO would identify themselves more with 
the downward target than individuals low in SCO, particularly when they were 
relatively lonely, when, after all, the actual resemblance between themselves and 
the target would be greater. Consequently. they would be in a more negative 
mood afterwards. Likewise, we predicted that individuals high in SCO would iden-
tify themselves more with the upward target than low SCO individuals, particu-
larly when they were not lonely, when, after all, the actual resemblance between 
themselves and the target would be greater, and that they would consequently be 
in a more positive mood afterwards. Partly support for these hypotheses comes 
from studies indicating that people who are low in subjective well-being identify 
themselves less with an upward target and more with a downward target than 
those who are high in subjective well-being (e.g. Buunk et al., 2001c; Ybema et 
al., 1996; VanderZee et al., 1998a). To test our hypotheses, the participants were 
exposed to a description of either an upward target who was enjoying a good 
social life or to a downward target who suffered from loneliness. Beforehand, we 
assessed the participants’ feelings of loneliness and, afterwards, their moods and 
the degree to which they identified themselves with the target. 
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Method
One hundred and eleven first-year psychology students participated in our 
paper-and-pencil study during a mass testing session for which they received 
partial course credit. The participants were randomly assigned to either the up-
ward or the downward conditions. 
To separate the measurement of the moderating variables from the experimental 
part, the questionnaire was presented as if it contained two independent studies. 
The first study was called ‘Personality and study’ and the second study was called 
‘Perception of articles in the media’. The first part of the questionnaire consisted 
of demographic questions and the measures of SCO and loneliness. The second 
part of the questionnaire contained the description of the comparison targets 
and the dependent measures.
 
Social comparison orientation. 
Individual differences in social comparison orientation were measured using the 
Iowa-Netherlands Comparison Orientation Measure (INCOM, Gibbons & Buunk, 
1999). This scale consists of 11 items such as ‘I always pay a lot of attention to 
how I do things compared with how others do things’, and ‘I never consider my 
situation in life relative to that of other people’ (reversed). The items were mea-
sured using 5-point scales (1= strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree; M = 3.5, 
SD = .65; alpha = .89). 
Feelings of loneliness.
 Individual differences in feelings of loneliness were measured using a new scale 
based on items of the revised and translated version of Russell, Peplau, and 
Cutrona’s 1980 UCLA Loneliness Scale (Gerritsen, 1997). We revised this scale 
because it measures severe loneliness while Dutch first-year students often expe-
rience milder forms of loneliness. Using a less extreme measure, we were better 
able to differentiate between the participants. The five items from the UCLA with 
the highest item-total correlation in a pre-study among first-year students were 
reformulated. For example, item 14 ‘ I feel isolated from others’ was changed 
into ‘Sometimes I have the feeling that I am becoming a bit isolated from others’. 
The other items were ‘Every now and then I lack companionship around me’,
Participants and Design
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‘I sometimes feel a bit lonely’, ‘There aren’t that many people I feel close to’, and 
‘Sometimes I feel left out’. Answers were given on a 5-point scale (1= strongly 
disagree, 5 = strongly agree; M = 2.5, SD = .82; alpha = .82).
Comparison targets. 
The participants were exposed to a bogus interview with a first-year student 
who told about his or her experiences in forming friendships and building up a 
new social network, which is an important subject to first-year students. Based 
on in-depth interviews with first-year students, two interview fragments were 
written, an upward version and a downward version. In the upward version, the 
student was very positive about his or her social life (the sex of the target was 
not decided). The student had become acquainted with many fellow-students, 
had formed good friendships with some of them, got along with roommates, 
and could always find someone to have fun with or to have a good conversation 
with. In the downward version, the student was rather negative about his or 
her social life. The student had no real friends and told of standing alone during 
breaks at college, having hardly any contact with roommates, and being alone 
often, watching TV, or studying. We made the interviews as realistic as possible 
by giving them a newspaper-article layout. 
Mood and identification.
 Mood and identification were the main dependent variables and were assessed 
directly after exposure(2). Mood was measured first using two questions; ‘How 
positive is your mood at this moment’ and ‘How negative is your mood at this 
moment?’. Answers were given on a 5-point scale (1 = not or hardly, 5 = ex-
tremely). Because the correlation between the two items was - .65 (p < .001), the 
negative item was reversed and both items were combined in one scale of posi-
tive mood (M = 3.6, SD = .75). Degree of identification with the target was mea-
sured using the following items (see also Brenninkmeijer, 2002; Ybema & Buunk, 
1995): ‘Could you recognize yourself in this person?’, ‘Did you think you resemble 
this person?’, and ‘To what extent did you think that in the future things might 
become (or stay) the same for you as for this person?’. Answers were given on a 
5-point scale (1 = not, 5 = very strongly; M = 2.1, SD = 1.00; alpha = .88).
 
Ratings of the target.
To determine the successfulness of the manipulation of the direction of expo-
2 Self-evaluations after upward and downward exposure were also assessed in a similar manner as in Chapter 3. 
However, no significant results were found concerning self-evaluation. 
71
Chapter 4
sure, two questions were asked. First, the participants were asked to indicate on 
a 9-point scale how positively or negatively they felt that the target portrayed 
his or her social life (1= very negatively, 5 = not negatively, not positively, 9 = 
very positively). Secondly, the participants were asked how they perceived the 
target’s social life in comparison with their own social lives (1 = much worse, 5 
= not worse, not better, and 9 = much better) in order to determine whether the 
upward target was really evaluated as being better off and whether the down-
ward target was really evaluated as being worse off.
Results
Ratings of the target.
 A Univariate Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) revealed that the participants found 
that the upward target described his or her social life more positively than the 
downward target did (Mupward = 8.2, SD = 1.2; Mdownward = 2.1, SD = 1.4; F(1,106) 
= 580.90, p < .001). Furthermore, both ratings differed significantly from 5, the 
scale’s neutral midpoint (tupward (54) = 20.13, p < .001; tdownward (52) = -14.62, 
p < .001). A second ANOVA revealed that, in comparison with their own social 
lives, the participants rated the target’s social life as better in the upward condi-
tion than in the downward condition (M = 5.3, SD = 1.2 vs. M = 2.2, SD = 1.2; 
F(1,104) = 180.57, p < .001). Moreover, in both the upward and the downward 
conditions, the mean rating differed significantly from 5, the point at which the 
target’s social life is evaluated as equally good as the participants’ own (tupward (52) 
= 2.07, p < .05; tdownward (52) = -16.67, p < .001). It must be noted that although 
both evaluations differed significantly from 5, the downward manipulation was 
stronger than the upward manipulation. This is a rather general finding using 
this paradigm, (e.g. Ybema, et al. 1996), it is hard to get people to acknowledge 
that a target is better off. Acknowledging this, we consider the manipulation of 
direction of exposure successful. The participants found that the upward target 
gave a positive impression of his or her own social life, and they evaluated the 
target as better off than themselves. In addition, the participants found that the 
downward target gave a negative impression of his or her own social life, and 
evaluated the target as worse off than themselves. 
In order to test our hypotheses, regression analyses were conducted in which 
Regression Analyses
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either degree of identification or positive mood was the dependent variable. 
Direction of exposure, SCO, and feelings of loneliness were the independent vari-
ables. In the first step of the analyses, the main effects were entered. Next, three 
regression analyses were run in which each of the three two-way interactions 
was entered, in order to investigate whether each interaction significantly con-
tributed to the prediction of the dependent variable. In the last step, when all 
two-way interactions were added, the three-way interaction was added. Follow-
ing Aiken and West (1991), the continuous independent variables were standard-
ized and the B-values are reported instead of the ß-values. 
Identification. 
In the first step, a significant main effect of direction of exposure was found 
(B = .53, p < .001), indicating that the participants identified themselves more 
with the upward target than with the downward target. However, this main ef-
fect was qualified by a two-way interaction with SCO (R²-change = .052; F(1,105) 
= 8.16, p < .01), and a two-way interaction with loneliness (R²-change = .114; 
F(1,105) = 19.77, p < .001). Unexpectedly, the three-way interaction was not sig-
nificant. Therefore, both two-way interactions were investigated independently 
of the third predictor. As depicted in Figure 1, inspection of the simple slopes for 
the interaction between direction and SCO revealed that, as expected, as partici-
pants were higher in SCO, they identified more with the downward target (B = 
.27, p < .05), but, unexpectedly, less with the upward target (B = -.21. p < .05). 
Secondly, simple slopes analyses for the interaction between direction and loneli-
ness revealed that, not surprisingly, as participants were lonelier, they identified 
more with the downward target (B = .34, p < .01), and less with the upward 
target (B = -.34, p = .001), as can be seen in Figure 2. 
 Figure 1. Degree of identification with the upward and downward targets as a function of 
 social comparison orientation. 
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 Figure 2.
 Degree of identification with the upward and downward targets as a function of feelings of 
 loneliness.
Mood. 
In the first step, a significant main effect of loneliness was found (B = -.26, p = 
.001), indicating that the lonelier participants were, the less positive moods they 
had after exposure to the upward or downward target. No other main effect 
was significant, nor was any two-way interaction. However, the three-way inter-
action was significant (R²-change = .062; F(1,102) = 7.86, p < .01). Therefore, 
further analyses were performed in the downward and the upward conditions. 
In the downward condition, the main effect of loneliness was again significant 
(B = -.31, p < .01). In addition, despite the fact that the two-way interaction 
between direction and SCO was not significant, a significant main effect of SCO 
was found (B = -.21, p  < .05, 1-tailed), indicating that, as predicted, participants 
were in a less positive mood after downward exposure as they were higher in 
SCO. In addition, an interaction effect between SCO and loneliness (p < .05) was 
found. Inspection of the simple slopes revealed that, as expected, in the down-
ward condition, the higher the level of SCO, the less positive the moods relatively 
lonely participants experienced (B = -.47, p < .01). For those feeling relatively not 
lonely, SCO was not related to mood when exposed to a downward target (B = 
.05, ns). The simple slopes are depicted in Figure 3. In the upward condition, SCO 
and loneliness had no interaction effect on positive mood, but the main effect of 
loneliness was again found (B = -.21, p = .059). The simple slopes are depicted 
in Figure 4.
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 Figure 3. 
 Positive mood after downward exposure for those feeling relatively lonely and for those feeling
  relatively not lonely as a function of social comparison orientation. 
 Figure 4. 
 Positive mood after upward exposure for those feeling relatively lonely and those feeling relatively 
 not lonely as a function of social comparison orientation. 
 
To further investigate whether identification with the target explains the mood 
effects of upward and downward exposure, mediation analyses were carried 
out. The preferable way would have been to conduct mediation analyses within 
each cell of a 2 (direction of exposure: upward, downward) X 2 (SCO: high, low) 
X 2 (loneliness: high, low) design. However, we did not have enough participants 
for this procedure (see Shrout & Bolger, 2002). Therefore, mediation analyses 
were performed separately in the upward and downward conditions for those 
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cases in which the above-reported regression analyses showed that SCO or lone-
liness was related to both positive mood and identification (see Baron & Kenny, 
1986). Figure 5 shows the elements of the mediation analyses. Thus, mediation 
analyses were performed when c and a were significant. Identification mediates 
the effect of SCO or loneliness on mood when the product of a and b is different 
from zero (see Shrout & Bolger, 2002). However, as Shrout and Bolger explain, 
when sample sizes are small, the distribution of the estimate of a X b is skewed, 
which may reduce the power to detect mediation when it exists in the popula-
tion. Therefore, we applied a bootstrap technique which allows the distribution 
of the estimates of a X b to be examined empirically and allows one to define the 
confidence interval by the cutpoints that exclude (a/2) x 100% of the values from 
each tail of the empirical distribution(3). 
 Figure 5. 
 Model for investigating whether identification with the target mediates the effects of SCO and 
 loneliness on positive mood.
Downward exposure.
 In the downward condition, SCO was related both to positive mood and to iden-
tification. As reported above, the higher participants were in SCO, the less posi-
tive the moods they experienced after downward exposure (B = -.21, p < .05, 
1-tailed), and the more they identified with the downward target (B = .27, p < 
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c
3 Following the instructions of Baron & Kenny (1986) for investigating mediation led to the same conclusions as 
did applying the bootstrap technique.
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.05). Applying the bootstrap technique, we found that the 95% confidence inter-
val for a X b was defined by -.249 and .012. This interval just includes zero, which 
would mean that identification does not mediate this effect. However, the 90% 
confidence interval was defined by -.215 and -.002, and did not include zero. 
Thus, indications were found that identification may partially mediate the effect 
of SCO, implying that individuals high in SCO experienced less positive mood af-
ter downward exposure, presumably because they identified themselves with the 
downward target. In addition, in the downward condition, we also found that 
the lonelier participants were, the less positive the moods they experienced (B = 
-.31, p < .01), and the more they identified with the downward target (B = .34, 
p < .01). Applying the bootstrap technique, we found that the 95% confidence 
interval for a X b was defined by -.279 and .071, which includes zero, and also 
the 90% confidence interval included zero (-.240 and .051). Thus, identification 
with the downward target could not explain why lonelier participants were in a 
less positive mood following downward exposure. 
Upward exposure.
 In the upward condition, only loneliness was related to both positive mood and 
identification, and not SCO. The above-reported regression analyses showed that 
the lonelier participants were, the less positive the moods they had after upward 
exposure (B = -.21, p = .059), and the less they identified with the upward target 
(B = -.34, p = .001). Using the bootstrap technique, the 95% confidence inter-
val for a X b was defined by -.147 and .087, which includes zero, and the 90% 
confidence interval also included zero (-.128 and .057). Thus, identification with 
the upward target could not explain why lonelier participants were in a less posi-
tive mood following upward exposure. In sum, the degree to which participants 
identified themselves with the target seemed to only partially mediate the effect 
of SCO on positive mood in the downward condition, and did not mediate the 
effects of loneliness on positive mood in either the upward or downward condi-
tions.
 
Discussion 
In this study, it was investigated how individual differences in social comparison 
orientation determine people’s moods after exposure to better- and worse-off 
others. It was predicted that people with a higher SCO would identify themselves 
Social comparison orientation and Identification
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more with upward and downward others and would, therefore, respond more 
positively to upward exposure and more negatively to downward exposure, than 
those with a low SCO. Furthermore, loneliness was expected to moderate these 
effects: we predicted that individuals high in SCO would identify themselves 
more with a downward target, particularly when they were relatively lonely, and 
consequently respond more negatively to downward exposure. Likewise, it was 
predicted that individuals high in SCO would identify themselves more with an 
upward target than individuals low in SCO, particularly when they were not lone-
ly, and consequently respond more positively to upward exposure. The results 
were largely in line with our predictions concerning downward exposure, but not 
concerning upward exposure. 
Downward exposure. 
Concerning exposure to a downward target the results showed, as expected, 
that relatively lonely participants with higher SCO were in a less positive mood 
after downward exposure. This finding is in line with the findings of other stud-
ies showing that people who are both high in SCO and low in well-being re-
spond particularly negatively to social comparison (e.g., Buunk et al.,2001c). The 
finding may, however, appear to contradict the results of a study by Buunk et 
al. (2001a) on relationship satisfaction. They found that downward comparison 
was a successful rather than unsuccesful way to enhance satisfaction for those 
who were high in SCO and initially unsatisfied with their relationship. It must be 
noted, however, that downward comparison in their study was induced by ask-
ing participants to name features of their relationship in which they considered 
their relationship to be better than that of most others. This may have offered 
individuals high in SCO a helpful strategy that prevented them from identify-
ing themselves with the downward target through focussing their attention on 
their superior position compared to worse-off others. Indeed, the present study 
offered partial support for the prediction that it is through identifying them-
selves with the downward target, that individuals high in SCO are in a less posi-
tive mood after downward exposure. This finding is in accordance with research 
showing that identification is associated with assimilative effects (e.g., Ybema 
et al., 1996). However, in contrast to our hypothesis, individuals high in SCO did 
not identify to a particularly high degree with the downward target when they 
were lonely, suggesting that individuals high in SCO identify themselves with 
worse-off others independently of the actual resemblance between themselves 
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and the other. Instead, loneliness was found to increase identification with the 
downward target independently of SCO. However, mediation analyses showed 
that identification with the downward target could not explain why lonely par-
ticipants responded more negatively to downward exposure. Apparently, identi-
fying with a worse-off other as a result of high SCO is psychologically different 
from downward identification as a result of an actual resemblance to someone 
else.
 
Upward exposure. 
In contrast to our hypothesis, SCO was not related to mood after upward expo-
sure. In addition, participants with higher SCO identified themselves less, rather 
than more, with the upward target. Combined with the finding that people high 
in SCO identified themselves more with the downward target, the latter find-
ing suggests that people high in SCO display a rather unfavorable identification 
pattern, which may be related to their somewhat neurotic personality (Gibbons 
& Buunk, 1999). Mood after upward exposure was found to be related to loneli-
ness; the lonelier participants were, the less positive their mood was after up-
ward exposure. In addition, lonelier participants also identified less with the up-
ward target. However, this lessened identification with the upward target could 
not explain why lonelier participants were in less positive moods after the expo-
sure. In fact, identification with neither the upward nor the downward target 
appeared to mediate the effect of loneliness on mood. This main effect of loneli-
ness on mood appears to reflect merely that lonely individuals are, in general, in 
a less positive mood than individuals who are not lonely, irrespective of possible 
comparisons with others. It is difficult to draw conclusions about the effects of 
SCO on responses to upward exposure, as the present findings are not consistent 
with our hypotheses or with other existing findings. We did not find mood ef-
fects of SCO after upward exposure, but Brenninkmeijer (2002) did. They found 
that individuals high in SCO responded less positively to upward exposure when 
they were also high in burnout. Furthermore, our study showed that people high 
in SCO identified less with the upward target, whereas Buunk et al. (2001c) found 
that identification with a better-off other was related to both SCO and burnout. 
As people were higher in burnout, they identified less with the upward target, 
but this was only true for those low in SCO. Those high in SCO identified with the 
upward target independently of their level of burnout. These findings may sug-
gest a self-defensive reaction of those high in SCO, because among those high in 
burnout, upward identification appeared to be higher for individuals high in SCO 
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than for individuals low in SCO. In accordance with the present findings, Buunk 
et al. (2001c) found that SCO did not influence the affective responses to upward 
exposure. Taken together, these findings seem to suggest that, on the one hand, 
people with higher SCO respond less favorably to upward exposure, particularly 
when they are also low in well-being and, on the other hand, when they are low 
in well-being, they may sometimes employ a self-defensive reaction.
Implications and conclusions. 
The present research, in combination with the existing research, suggests that 
people who are both high in SCO and low in subjective well-being respond par-
ticularly negatively to exposure to worse-off others. In addition, our results sug-
gest that individuals high in SCO respond negatively to exposure to worse-off 
others, at least partially, because they identify themselves with the downward 
target. Furthermore, we found that individuals high in SCO employ a rather un-
favorable identification pattern. However, more research is needed into how SCO 
influences people’s reactions to exposure to better-off others, as the data are not 
consistent. Trying to overlook all the existing literature on SCO, an interesting 
direction for further research seems to be to investigate the hypothesis that indi-
viduals high in SCO, by disposition, react negatively to both upward and down-
ward exposure, particularly when they are also low in well-being. Yet, that under 
certain circumstances, they may employ strategies to benefit from comparison 
with others, for example, strategies to prevent themselves from identifying with 
worse-off others (Buunk et al, 2001a) or to find ways to identify with better-off 
others when, in fact, they are rather dissimilar (Buunk et al.,2001c). 
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Abstract - In two studies among 79 and 88 students, it was investigated how, when, and for whom 
exposure to a lively description of a downward target would be beneficial. Concerning the question 
of how, it was investigated whether a social comparison process or an identification process leads 
to beneficial effects. Concerning the question of when, it was examined whether it is particularly 
when people are low in subjective well-being (cf., Wills, 1981), or, more generally, when people find 
the comparison dimension personally important that downward comparison is beneficial. Concern-
ing the question of who, we predicted that only people with a high score on the individual differ-
ence variable social comparison orientation would benefit from downward comparison. The results 
showed that, when people found the comparison dimension important, either because they were 
low in subjective well-being or because they found it important to excel on the comparison dimen-
sion, comparison, and not identification, with the downward target had beneficial effects, but only 
when they were high in social comparison orientation. 
Do people feel better about themselves when they compare themselves with others 
who are worse off than they are? Why is that so? Is this true for everyone? 
It has long been noted that people may compare themselves with others in order 
to feel better about themselves. Hakmiller (1966) suggested that this self-
enhancement motive for social comparison is especially likely when individuals 
are suffering from some sort of threat such that social comparison may function 
as a way of “sustaining or reasserting the favorability of the individuals self-
regard” (page 37). Wills (1981) proposed that especially comparison with worse-
off others may be used for self-enhancement purposes. According to his theory 
of downward comparison, persons who experience negative affect can enhance 
their subjective well-being through comparison with a less fortunate other. In-
deed, several research findings are in line with this hypothesis (e.g., Aspinwall & 
Taylor, 1993; Buunk, Oldersma, & De Dreu, 2001a; Wood, Michela, & Giordano, 
2000). For example, Gibbons et al., (2002) found that individuals who performed 
poorly on a test or an exam lowered their preferred comparison levels, and were 
more interested in comparing themselves with persons who performed worse 
than they had than with persons who performed well. Furthermore, in a study by 
Gibbons (1986), depressed and non-depressed students were exposed to a lively 
description of a downward comparison target, after which their moods were as-
sessed. In line with Wills’ theory, it was found that the moods of the depressed 
students had improved after the downward comparison, but not the moods of 
the non-depressed students. However, exposure to a downward target does not 
always lead to beneficial effects, as some studies indicated that it can also affect 
This chapter is based on: Groothof, H.A.K., Buunk, A.P., Siero, F.W. (2003). How, when, and for whom downward 
comparison will be beneficial. Manuscript submitted for publication.
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people negatively (e.g., Ybema, Buunk & Heesink, 1996). In the present study, 
we aimed to discover how, when, and for whom exposure to a downward target 
will have beneficial effects. We firstly investigated what process underlies the 
beneficial effects of downward exposure, a social comparison process or an iden-
tification process. Secondly, we investigated whether downward exposure only 
works for people who are low in subjective well-being, or whether downward 
exposure can also be beneficial when people find the comparison dimension 
important. Finally, we examined whether all people can benefit from downward 
exposure, or whether individual differences in social comparison orientation de-
termine who can and who cannot benefit from downward exposure. 
Identification or social comparison? 
How does exposure to a worse-off other make people feel better? What caused 
the depressed students in Gibbons’ study (1986) to feel better after reading about 
an unfortunate fellow-student? There are two possible explanations. The first is 
that people may recognize themselves in the worse-off other which makes them 
realize that they are not the only ones in an unfortunate situation. Through iden-
tifying themselves with a downward target people low in subjective well-being 
may experience relief in a shared fate or a reduction in their sense of personal 
deviance (Gibbons & Gerrard, 1991). This notion is related to false consensus 
effects; people may overestimate the number of people who are in a similar, un-
fortunate, situation, in order to make themselves feel better (for an overview see 
Marks & Miller, 1987). Furthermore, finding relief in shared stress has also been 
suggested as a working mechanism for the beneficial effects of support groups 
(e.g., Gibbons, 1986). However, identifying oneself with a downward other may 
also contain a risk. Feeling similar to a person in an unfortunate situation may 
also emphasize one’s own inferior position. Indeed, a study by Ybema, et al., 
(1996) among people who recently lost their jobs showed that the more partici-
pants identified themselves with a downward target, the more negative affect 
they experienced. In addition, a study by Lockwood (2002) showed that when 
students who were exposed to a downward target were able to imagine things 
“that could cause them to have a similar academic experience”, which, in fact, 
is an identification process, they rated themselves more negatively afterwards. 
Also, Mussweiler (2003) suggested that when people expect to be similar to a 
downward other, they will render information accessible that they are in fact 
similar to the other, resulting in a decline in mood and self-evaluation (see also 
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Mussweiler & Strack, 2000). In sum, although identification with a downward 
other may offer the opportunity for finding relief in a shared fate, we predicted 
that, when people with low subjective well-being identify themselves with a 
downward target, they will feel worse rather than better about themselves af-
terwards. 
The second possible explanation for the beneficial effects of exposure to worse-
off others is that people compare themselves with the downward other and con-
clude that “things could be worse” (see also Taylor, Wood, & Lichtman, 1983) and 
that they were relatively well off.  Often, the term social comparison is used to 
refer both to processes that may lead people to contrast themselves away from a 
target, and to processes that may lead people to assimilative themselves towards 
a target. However, we predict that when people literally compare themselves 
with others, they use the other as a reference point to evaluate the self against, 
which will typically result in contrastive responses (see also Mussweiler, 2003; 
Stapel & Koomen, 2000; Tesser, 1988). In line with this hypothesis are results of a 
study by Mussweiler (2001) in which participants were literally instructed to com-
pare themselves with a target named Emily. It was found that when participants 
compared themselves with the low-assertive Emily, they subsequently evaluated 
themselves more assertive than when they compared themselves to the high-
assertive Emily (see also Martin & Gentry, 1997; Cattarin, Thompson, Thomas, & 
Williams, 2000). Therefore, we predicted that when people with low subjective 
well-being literally compare themselves with a downward target, they would feel 
better about themselves as a consequence.
Low subjective well-being or importance?
 Both Hakmiller (1966) and Wills (1981) proposed that self-enhancement would 
occur particularly for people who are in a negative mood or low in subjective 
well-being. We, however, would like to suggest that downward social compari-
son is beneficial not only for people who are in a negative mood or low in subjec-
tive well-being, but more generally, for people for whom the comparison dimen-
sion is personally relevant. One effect of low well-being is that the dimension on 
which one is under threat may become an important comparison dimension. For 
example, a person who was never much interested in how healthy he was would 
probably find health very important after having had a heart attack. We propose 
that it is primarily because of this importance, and not because of the threat, 
that people feel better about themselves after downward comparison. Thus, also 
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when a comparison dimension is personally important because a person strives 
for competence on a particular dimension or defines himself in terms of a cer-
tain dimension (see also Tesser, 1988), we expected to find beneficial effects of 
downward comparison. 
Social comparison orientation. 
A third aspect of the present studies concerns the role of individual differences 
in social comparison orientation (SCO: Gibbons, & Buunk, 1999). SCO indicates 
the degree to which people pay attention to how their situation is compared to 
that of others, and base their evaluation of their characteristics on how others 
are doing. Research shows that people who are high in SCO are indeed more 
interested in social comparison information (e.g., VanderZee, Oldersma, Buunk, 
& Bos, 1998b), and more affected by social comparison (e.g., Buunk, Zurriaga, 
Gonzalez-Roma, & Subirats, 2003; Buunk, Ybema, Gibbons, & Ipenburg, 2001c). 
Because we predicted that a social comparison process would be responsible 
for the beneficial effects of downward exposure, we predicted that only, people 
who are high in SCO would benefit from comparison with a worse-off other. 
A study by Buunk et al. (2001a) shows results that are particularly relevant to 
the present research. They investigated whether people who face problems in a 
close relationship may enhance their satisfaction with the relationship through 
downward comparison. The participants were instructed to either list features of 
their relationship that they considered good or features in which they considered 
their relationship to be better than that of most others (downward comparison 
condition). In line with Wills’ theory (1981), the results showed that downward 
comparison increased relational satisfaction for those who were suffering from 
relational discontent, however, this effect was only found for those who were 
high in SCO. Therefore, we further investigated the role of SCO in this respect. 
We hypothesized that for people who are low in subjective well-being, only those 
with a high SCO may benefit from comparing themselves with a downward other, 
not only when they purely cognitively compare themselves with worse-off oth-
ers, as in the study of Buunk et al. (2001a), but also when they are exposed to a 
downward target.
Overview of the studies. 
In this article, two studies are described in which the participants were exposed to 
a lively description of a downward target. Study 1 is a reanalysis of data of Study 
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2 described in Chapter 1 including an additional independent variable (Groothof, 
Buunk, & Siero, 2003). The dependent variable that we used in that study may be 
criticized because of demand characteristic problems, as we directly asked the 
participants how reading about the target may have changed their self-evalua-
tions. Nevertheless, we present the data here, because they are highly relevant to 
the present research questions, and because we think that a demand character-
istic explanation cannot account for the complexity of the results. In Study 1, the 
downward target was a lonely first-year student, telling about his disappointing 
social experiences. In Study 2, the downward target was a third-year student who 
performed poorly academically. The first issue that we investigated was whether 
a social comparison process underlies the beneficial effects of exposure to a 
downward target and not an identification process, which we expected to lead 
to adverse effects. Therefore, in both studies, the participants were instructed 
to either compare or identify themselves with the downward target. The second 
issue we investigated was whether downward exposure would be beneficial not 
only to people who are feeling lonely (Study 1), but also to people who find it 
important to excel academically (Study 2). Finally, we predicted that only those 
high in SCO would benefit from downward comparison. 
Study 1
Method
The study was conducted among 79 first-year psychology students during an 
obligatory first-year psychology course. Two students were excluded from the 
data because they were 40 years or older at the time of the study. The average 
age of the 77 participants was 20 years (SD = 1.86). The participants received a 
paper-and-pencil questionnaire, which contained some demographic questions 
and personality measures in the first part. The second part of the questionnaire 
was an experimental section in which the participants were presented with the 
downward target preceded by an instruction to either compare or identify them-
selves with the target. Participants were randomly assigned to one of these two 
experimental conditions.
Participants and Design
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Feelings of loneliness. 
Individual differences in feelings of loneliness were measured using a new scale 
based on items of the revised and translated version of Russell, Peplau, and 
Cutrona’s 1980 UCLA Loneliness Scale (Gerritsen, 1997). We revised this scale 
because it measures severe loneliness, while Dutch first-year students often ex-
perience milder forms of loneliness. Using a less extreme measure, we were bet-
ter able to differentiate between participants. Five items from the UCLA, with 
the highest item-total correlation in a pre-study among first-year students, were 
reformulated. For example, item 14 ‘ I feel isolated from others’ was changed 
into ‘Sometimes I have the feeling that I am becoming a bit isolated from others’. 
The other items were ‘Every now and then I lack companionship around me’, ‘I 
sometimes feel a bit lonely’, ‘There aren’t that many people I feel close to’, and 
‘Sometimes I feel left out’. Answers were given on a 5-point scale (1= strongly 
disagree, 5 = strongly agree; M = 2.8; SD = .91; Cronbach’s alpha = .78).
Social comparison orientation.
 Individual differences in SCO were measured using the Iowa-Netherlands Com-
parison Orientation Measure (Gibbons & Buunk, 1999). This scale consists of 11 
items such as “I always pay a lot of attention to how I do things compared with 
how others do things” and “I never consider my situation in life relative to that 
of other people” (reversed). The items were measured using 5-point scales (1 = 
strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree; M = 3.5; SD = .59; Cronbach’s alpha = 
.82). 
Downward target.
 The participants were presented with a bogus newspaper article containing an 
interview with a first-year student about his or her social life (the sex of the tar-
get was not specified). The interview was based on actual in-depth interviews 
with first-year students and the article was made as realistic as possible by giv-
ing it a newspaper-article layout. In the interview, the student is rather negative 
about his or her social life. The student has no real friends and tells of standing 
alone during breaks at college, having hardly any contact with roommates, and 
being alone often, watching TV, or studying. 
Measures and Stimulus Materials
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Instructions for social comparison and identification.
 Before the participants read this interview, they were instructed to either com-
pare or to identify themselves with the target. The social comparison instructions 
read as follows: 
When a person tells something about himself, for example, about how thing are 
going with his studies or about an experience which he had, a common reaction 
of listeners is that they compare themselves with that person. Many people start 
thinking about their own experiences when a person tells them something that 
might also happen to them.
On the next page, you will find an interview with a first-year student that ap-
peared in the media last year. The section in which this person tells about his or 
her social life will offer people who are also first-year students many opportuni-
ties for comparison.
When you read this interview in a minute, compare yourself as much as possible 
with this person. 
With reference to this student’s story, think about your own social life and try 
to assess how your social life is at this moment, compared with that of this stu-
dent.
Please take your time in reading the interview. Afterwards, you may continue 
with the rest of the questionnaire. 
The identification instructions read as follows:
When a person tells something about himself, for example, about how thing are 
going with his studies or about an experience which he had, a common reaction 
of listeners is that they recognize themselves in that person. Many people realize 
that they have a lot in common with other people and that they resemble others 
in many ways. 
On the next page, you will find an interview with a first-year student that ap-
peared in the media last year. The section in which this person tells about his or 
her social life will sound very familiar to people who are also first-year students. 
When you read this interview in a minute, pay the most attention to things you 
have in common with this person. Assume that this person is someone just like 
you. If you don’t recognize much of yourself in this person, imagine that in the 
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future things might be the same for you as for this person.
Please take your time in reading the interview. Afterwards, you may continue 
with the rest of the questionnaire. 
Self-evaluative reaction. 
The participants’ self-evaluative reactions to the downward target were meas-
ured using the 4 items. Because people may be reluctant to admit being affected 
by upward or downward exposure (see Wood, 1996), a short introduction was 
given in which it was explained that it is quite common for most, but not all, 
people to be affected by information about others. The items were “After read-
ing this interview fragment, to what extent are you more or less satisfied with 
your own social life, or has nothing changed?”, “After reading this interview 
fragment, to what extent are you more or less secure about your own social 
life, or has nothing changed?”, “After reading this interview fragment, to what 
extent do you feel more or less lonely, or has nothing changed?”, “After reading 
this interview fragment, to what extent do you worry more or less about your 
own social life, or has nothing changed?”. Answers were given on a 9-point scale 
(e.g., 1 = much more worried, 5 = no change, 9 = much less worried). Two items 
were recoded so that higher scores indicated that the participants’ evaluations of 
their own social lives were more positive (M = 5.7; SD = 1.07; Cronbach’s alpha 
= .83). 11.7% of the participants indicated that their self-evaluations had not 
changed (i.e. answered 5 on every self-evaluation question). 
Ratings of the target. 
The participants were asked how they evaluated the target’s social life in compar-
ison with their own (1 = much worse, 5 = about the same, 9 = much better) in 
order to determine whether the downward target was really evaluated as being 
worse-off. In addition, the participants were asked to indicate on a 9-point scale 
how positive or negative they found the image that the person in the interview 
portrayed of his or her social life (1= very positive, 9 = very negative).
Results 
Ratings of the target. 
The participants evaluated the downward target’s social life as worse than their 
own (M  = 3.3, SD = 2.39). A t-test revealed that this rating differed significantly 
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from 5, the point at which the target’s social life is evaluated as equally good as 
one’s own (t(76) = -6.15, p < .001). In addition, the participants found that the 
target portrayed a negative image of his of her social life (M = 7.8, SD = 1.03). 
A t-test revealed that this rating differed significantly from 5, the scale’s neutral 
midpoint (t(73) = 23.70, p < .001). Thus, the participants did perceive the target 
as downward.
Self-evaluative reactions to the downward target. 
 To test our hypotheses, regression analyses were performed using instruction, 
loneliness, and SCO as predictors, and the self-evaluative reaction as the depen-
dent variable. In the first step of the analyses, the main effects were entered. 
Next, three regression analyses were run in which each of the three two-way 
interactions was entered, in order to investigate whether each interaction sig-
nificantly contributed to the prediction of the dependent variable. In the last 
step, when all two-way interactions were added, the three-way interaction was 
added. Following Aiken and West (1991), the continuous independent variables 
were standardised and the B-values are reported instead of the ß-values. The first 
of the step analyses did not yield a significant main effect, and no significant 
two-way interaction was found in the second step (all R²-change’s < .021; all 
F’s(1,71) < 1.59, all p’s > .21). However, as expected, the three-way interaction 
was significant (R²-change = .050; F(1,68) = 4.06, p = .048). Further analyses re-
vealed that only among those high in SCO was a significant interaction between 
instruction and loneliness found (p = .007), and not among those low in SCO. 
Inspection of the simple slopes revealed that, in line with our predictions, among 
those high in SCO, as they felt lonelier, comparison with the downward target 
led to more positive self-evaluative reactions (B = .71, p = .011), while identifi-
cation with the downward target led to more negative self-evaluative reactions 
(B = - .27, ns), but this latter effect was not significant. The slopes are depicted 
in Figure 1. Among those with a low SCO, neither in the identification condition 
nor in the comparison condition was loneliness related to the self-evaluative re-
sponse (see Figure 2).
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Figure 1.
Self-evaluative response to downward exposure as a function of feelings of loneliness in the com-
parison and identification conditions for participants high in social comparison orientation. 
Figure 2.
Self-evaluative response to downward exposure as a function of feelings of loneliness in the com-
parison and identification conditions for participants low in social comparison orientation. 
Discussion and Introduction to Study 2
In line with Wills’ downward comparison theory (1981), it was found that rela-
tively lonely participants benefited from comparison with a worse-off other, and 
that those who were not lonely did not. In addition, the data suggested that it 
was specifically comparison with a downward target that caused them to feel 
better about themselves, and not identification with the downward target. Thus, 
it appeared that knowing that one is relatively well off is responsible for the 
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beneficial effect of downward exposure, and not a feeling of shared fate. Al-
though we expected downward identification to lead to negative reactions, the 
data did not support that prediction. Finally, as predicted, the data suggested 
that only people who are dispositionaly more inclined to base their self-evalua-
tions on comparison with others, e.g., people who have a high SCO, benefit from 
downward comparison. In Study 2, these issues were further investigated, using 
academic performance as the comparison dimension. Unlike in Study 1, in which 
we found that downward comparison was beneficial for people with low subjec-
tive well-being, in Study 2 we hypothesized that the same beneficial effects of 
downward comparison may be found for people who find it important to excel. 
Two other changes were made. Firstly, the formulation of the dependent variable 
in Study 1 may have raised doubts because of demand characteristics concerns. 
The questions assessing the self-evaluative reactions referred directly to the tar-
get information, which, one may argue, might prompt participants to report 
effects that seem ‘appropriate’. That is, because the purpose of the question 
may seem obvious to the participants, they might adjust their answers to suit the 
researchers’ intent (see also Schwarz, 1999). However, we believe that a demand 
characteristic explanation cannot account for the complexity of the results, as 
it cannot explain why particularly lonely participants with a high SCO benefited 
from downward comparison. However, to exclude a demand characteristic expla-
nation, in Study 2, we measured the dependent variables without referring to the 
interview fragment, which would make the researcher’s intentions less obvious. 
Both the participants’ moods and self-evaluations were assessed in this manner. 
Secondly, we included a control condition in which participants did not receive 
specific instructions on how to read the target information in order to investigate 
how people would react to downward information more spontaneously.
Study 2
Method
Eighty-eight students (63 males and 25 females) participated in this paper-and-
pencil experiment during several third-year courses in Business Management. 
The average age of the participants was 21.9 years (SD = 1.15). First, some demo-
graphic questions were asked, followed by some personality measures. Partici-
Participants and Design
92
pants were randomly assigned to the no-instruction control condition, the social 
comparison condition, or the identification condition. 
Social comparison orientation. 
SCO was again measured using the INCOM (Gibbons & Buunk, 1999). The inter-
nal consistency of the scale was good with Cronbach’s alpha = .82 (M = 3.5, SD 
= .53). 
Importance of excelling academically.
Two questions were asked to assess how important participants found it to excel 
academically: “How important is it for you to achieve excellent study results?” 
and “How important is it for you to be a top student?”. Answers were given on 
a 7-point scale (1= totally unimportant, 7 = very important). The correlation 
between both items was .66 (p < .001) and they were combined in one scale 
(M = 3.8, SD = 1.23).
 
Downward target. 
The participants read a bogus newspaper article describing the experiences of a 
student in Business Management. The female participants read an article about 
a female student (named “Paula”) and the male participants read about a male 
student (named “Paul”). Paul(a) is said to be behind schedule, with grades be-
low average, and it is said that (s)he needs to retake exams. A teacher describes 
Paul(a) as a moderate student, who is not a real team worker and who has dif-
ficulty in applying theory practically. Furthermore, Paul(a) used to be a member 
of the management of a fraternity, but that was not a success. Paul(a) was liked 
by the others but did not make a contribution to organizing an important confer-
ence. We made the articles as realistic as possible by giving them a newspaper-
article layout. Before reading the interview, participants either received no spe-
cific instruction or they were instructed to either compare or identify themselves 
with the target, using the same instructions as in Study 1. 
Dependent variables. 
Mood and self-evaluation were the main dependent variables and were assessed 
directly after the exposure. Mood was measured using two questions; “How 
positive is your mood at this moment” and “How negative is your mood at this 
Measures and Stimulus Materials
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moment?”. Answers were given on a 5-point scale (1 =not at all or hardly, 5 = 
very strongly). Because the correlation between the two items was - .67 (p < .001), 
the negative mood item was recoded and both items were combined in one 
scale (M  = 3.5, SD = .85). Self-evaluations of the participants’ own study per-
formances were measured using 4 items (alpha = .65). “How satisfied are you 
at this moment with your own academic performance?”, “How certain are you 
at this moment about your own academic performance?”, “How intelligent do 
you feel at this moment?”, and “How concerned are you at this moment about 
your own academic performance?” (reversed). Answers were given on a 5-point 
scale (1 = not at all or hardly, 5 = very strongly; M = 3.6, SD= .59). To deter-
mine whether the target was indeed perceived as downward, two questions 
were asked, analogous to those in Study 1. First, the participants were asked to 
indicate on a 9-point scale how positively or negatively they found that Paul(a)’s 
academic performance was described (1= very negatively, 5 = not negatively, 
not positively, 9 = very positively). Second, the participants were asked how 
they perceived the target’s academic performance in comparison with their own 
(1 = much worse, 5 = about the same, 9 = much better) in order to determine 
whether the downward target was evaluated as downward.
Results and Discussion
Ratings of the target. 
The participants found that a negative description was given of the downward 
target’s academic performance (M = 2.9, SD = 1.10). A t-test revealed that this 
rating differed significantly from 5, the scale’s neutral midpoint (t(38) = -11.66, 
p < .001)(2). In addition, the participants evaluated the downward target as per-
forming worse than they performed (M  = 3.8, SD = 1.81). A t-test revealed that 
this rating differed significantly from 5, the point at which the target’s academic 
performance is evaluated as equally good as one’s own (t(83) = -6.20, p < .001). 
Thus, the target was indeed perceived as downward.
 
 
To test our hypotheses, we performed hierarchical regression analyses following 
the recommendations of Aiken and West (1991) for investigating interactions be-
tween categorical variables with three levels and continuous variables. We coded 
the three experimental conditions using two dummy variables, the first contrast-
2 Only 39 participants were included in this analysis, because in some questionnaires, one scale anchor was not 
correctly described.  
Main Analyses
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ing the comparison condition with the identification condition, and the second 
contrasting the comparison condition with the control condition. Both impor-
tance and SCO were standardized, and the B-values are reported instead of the 
ß-values. In the first step of the regression analyses, the four main effects were 
entered. In the second step, the two-way interactions between each dummy 
and importance, each dummy and SCO, and the interaction between importance 
and SCO were added. In the third step, the three-way interactions between each 
dummy, importance, and SCO were added. 
Mood. 
In the first step, a significant main effect of the contrast between the comparison 
and the control condition was found (B = -.43, p = .056), indicating that the 
participants in the comparison condition were in a more positive mood than the 
participants in the control condition. In the second step, no significant two-way 
interaction was found, however, adding both three-way interactions resulted in 
a significant increase in explained variance (R²-change = .135, F (2,74) = 6.34, 
p = .003). This effect was fully attributable to a significant interaction between 
the contrast between the comparison condition and the identification condition, 
importance, and SCO (p = .001). As can be seen in Figure 3, inspection of the 
simple slopes revealed that among those high in SCO, in the social comparison 
condition participants were in a more positive mood the more important they 
found it to excel (B = .46, p = .043), while in the identification condition, par-
ticipants who found it more important to excel were in a less positive mood (B = 
-.36, p = .084). The interaction between the contrast between the comparison 
condition and the control condition, importance, and SCO was not significant. 
Among those high in SCO, in both the comparison condition (B = .46, p = .043) 
and the control condition (B = .53, p = .10), participants were in a more positive 
mood the more important they found it to excel academically. Among partici-
pants low in SCO, in none of the conditions was a significant relation between 
importance to excel and mood found, as can be seen in Figure 4. 
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 Figure 3.
 Positive mood after downward exposure as a function of importance of excelling aca  
 demically in the comparison, identification, and no-instruction control 
 conditions for those high in social comparison orientation.
 Figure 4.
 Positive mood after downward exposure as a function of importance to excel academi  
 cally in the comparison and in the identification condition for those low in social
  comparison orientation. 
Self-evaluation. 
Unexpectedly, no significant effects were found concerning participants’ self-
evaluation after exposure to the downward target. Because of the relatively low 
reliability of the self-evaluation measure, we also performed analyses on the indi-
vidual items or combinations of two or three items. However, these analyses also 
yielded no significant results. 
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In conclusion, in the second study, in which the importance of the comparison 
dimension was due to a motivation to excel rather than to low subjective well-
being, the same pattern of results was found as in Study 1. For those who were 
high in SCO, the more important they found it to excel, the more positive their 
moods were after comparing, and not after identifying, themselves with the 
downward target. In the control condition, in which participants did not receive 
particular instructions on how to read the information about the target, almost 
the same results were found as in the comparison condition. Apparently, without 
receiving specific instructions, participants spontaneously compared themselves 
with the downward target, and did not spontaneously identify themselves with 
the downward target. The instruction to compare seems only to have increased 
the spontaneous comparison reaction. Unexpectedly, participants’ self-evalua-
tions were not affected by exposure to the downward target.
General Discussion
In two studies, we investigated the conditions under which exposure to a worse-
off other has beneficial effects. We predicted that people would feel better after 
exposure to a downward target because they compared themselves with the 
target and not because they identified themselves with the target; thus, that a 
sense of being better off rather than a feeling of shared fate underlies the ben-
eficial effect of downward exposure. In addition, we expected that exposure to a 
downward target would be beneficial not only when people are suffering from a 
decrease in subjective well-being, or under threat (cf. Wills, 1981), but more gen-
erally, when people find the comparison dimension personally important. There-
fore, in Study 1, it was investigated whether people who were low in well-being, 
that is feeling lonely, would benefit from downward comparison, and in Study 
2, it was investigated whether the same effects would be found among people 
who find it important to excel. Finally, we predicted that only people who have a 
higher social comparison orientation would benefit from downward comparison. 
The results were generally in line with these predictions. Both studies showed the 
same pattern of results: either because participants were low in well-being or 
because they found it important to excel, comparison with the downward target, 
and not identification with the downward target, led to beneficial effects, con-
firming the first and the second hypothesis. That is, in both cases, a feeling of be-
ing better off rather than a sense of shared fate underlay the beneficial effects of 
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downward exposure. Furthermore, these findings suggest that we should apply 
Will’s downward comparison theory at a more general level; it is not only when 
people are low in well-being, but more generally, when people find a compari-
son dimension important, that comparison with a worse-off other has beneficial 
effects. According to Wills, being low in well-being leads to a motivation to feel 
better about oneself, and downward comparison is a way of fulfilling that need. 
However, when people find it important to excel on a particular dimension, they 
may also have a need to feel better, which can also be satisfied by downward 
comparison. Our third hypothesis also received support both in Study 1 and in 
Study 2; only participants with a higher SCO benefited from downward compari-
son, and not those low in SCO. This finding is in line with the results obtained 
by Buunk et al. (2001a). They, however, used a more cognitive way of installing 
downward comparison than we did, strengthening the generalizability of the 
present finding. Furthermore, the present finding is in line with other studies 
showing that people high in SCO are more affected by social comparisons (e.g., 
Buunk et al.,2001c; Buunk et al., 2003). 
Some predictions were, however, not supported by the data. Firstly, in Study 1, 
participants’ self-evaluations were affected by downward comparison where-
as, in Study 2, participants’ self-evaluations were not affected, and only effects 
on mood were found. We suppose that the use of two different comparison 
dimensions, social life in Study 1 and academic performance in Study 2, may 
have caused these divergent findings. It is possible that, because academic per-
formance is more easily objectively quantified through grades and course cred-
its than one’s social life, people may have a better perception of their relative 
standing concerning academic performance than concerning their social lives. 
Therefore, it may be that self-evaluations concerning social life are more easily 
influenced by comparison with others than self-evaluations concerning academic 
performance, for which only effects on mood were found. It should be noted 
that, in Study 2, the effects on mood and self-evaluation diverged although we 
expected parallel effects on both variables. Apparently, cognitive and affective 
measures are not similar, a conclusion that other researchers have also drawn 
(e.g., Swann, Griffin, Predmore, & Gaines, 1987). Indeed, dual process theories 
(e.g., Epstein & Pacini, 1999) suggest that cognitive and affective processes are 
governed by two different systems that operate by different rules. Thus, it ap-
pears that one should be more specific about what kinds of effects, cognitive or 
affective, one expects. Secondly, identification with the downward target was 
not found to lead to significant averse reactions  
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in either study, only a trend in that direction was found. One explanation may be 
that identification with the downward targets was not threatening because the 
target and the participants were at a similar stage of development; both were 
either first-year students in Study 1 or third-year students in Study 2. The partici-
pants may already have gained enough experience to feel certain that they were 
unlikely to fall prey to the unfortunate situation of the downward target (see also 
Lockwood, 2002). Indeed, Lockwood showed that instructing first-year students 
to think about what could cause them to have a similar academic experience as 
the downward target, which, in fact, is an identification instruction, only led to 
negative effects when the target was a recent graduate and not when the target 
was also a first-year student.
In conclusion, in the present research, we attempted to discover how, when, and 
for whom exposure to a downward target has beneficial effects. Concerning the 
question of how, the results suggest that comparison with the downward target, 
and thus a feeling of being better off, underlies the beneficial effect of exposure 
to a worse-off other and not an identification process. Concerning the question 
of when, it appears that it is not only when people are low in subjective well-
being (cf. Wills, 1981), but, more generally, when people find the comparison 
dimension personally important that downward comparison can be beneficial. 
Finally, the results showed that not everyone can benefit from downward com-
parison, as it only seemed to work for people high in social comparison orientation. 
. 
 Downward comparison 
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Being confronted with a person who is in a similar situation but who is either 
better or worse off may evoke strong reactions in a person. People may respond 
to such a confrontation both affectively, and by changing their evaluation of 
themselves and their own situation. In the present dissertation, these responses 
to forced social comparisons were examined using a dual-process framework 
(Epstein & Pacini, 1999; Epstein, 2003). A social comparison process was dis-
tinguished that was assumed to operate according to the rules of a cognitive 
system, and an identification process was distinguished that was assumed to 
operate according to the rules of an experiential system. We predicted that the 
social comparison process, in which both similarities and differences between 
the self and the other were assumed to be systematically assessed, would lead 
to contrastive self-evaluative responses. That is, we expected that, after compari-
son with an upward other, people would evaluate themselves less positively and 
after comparison with a downward other, people would evaluate themselves 
more positively. Furthermore, we predicted that the identification process, in 
which, as we assumed, one perceives the other holistically and feels a bond with 
the other person, would lead to an assimilative affective response. That is, we 
expected that, identification with an upward other would evoke primarily posi-
tive affect and identification with a downward other would evoke primarily neg-
ative affect. Social comparison and identification were thus considered to be 
two fundamentally different kinds of processes that may occur simultaneously 
when people are exposed to others, leading to fundamentally different kinds of 
responses. In addition, the influence of two individual differences variables on 
how people may respond to upward and downward exposure were investigated. 
Firstly, people may differ in their inclination to compare themselves with others, 
that is in social comparison orientation (SCO). We predicted that people high in 
SCO would respond more strongly to upward and downward exposure, and that 
they would specifically identify themselves more with others than would people 
low in SCO. Secondly, the influence of individual differences in subjective well-
being was examined. We investigated how people low in subjective well-being 
may benefit from exposure to worse-off others. In this chapter, the main findings 
of the research presented in the previous chapters is first summarized, and then 
integrated and discussed. In addition, the implications for the theory of and the 
research into social comparison are discussed. 
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Summary of findings
Chapter 2.
 In two studies, student participants were exposed to an interview with a fellow-
student who either had a very good social life (upward target) or was feeling 
lonely (downward target). In both a correlational study and an experimental 
study, the affective and self-evaluative responses to these exposures were re-
lated to comparison and identification with the targets. In Experiment 1, it was 
found that social comparison was related particularly to a contrastive response 
to self-evaluation: the more people compared themselves with the upward tar-
get, the more negative their self-evaluations were, and the more they compared 
themselves with the downward target, the more positive their self-evaluations 
were. In addition, identification was related to an assimilative response to affect 
after upward exposure: the more people identified themselves with the upward 
target, the more positive affect the exposure evoked. However, this effect was 
found only for those who were high in social comparison orientation. In line 
with these results, Experiment 2 showed that a comparison instruction increased 
the contrastive response to self-evaluation whereas an identification instruction 
increased the assimilative response to affect. Thus, as expected, the social com-
parison and identification processes appeared to influence different kinds of re-
sponses in opposite directions. Concerning the influence of individual differences 
in social comparison orientation, the two studies showed that people with a high 
social comparison orientation both compared and identified themselves more 
with better and worse-off others than did those with a low social comparison 
orientation. Study 1 also showed that only people with a high social comparison 
orientation derived more positive affect from spontaneous identification with 
the upward target. 
Chapter 3.
The interplay between the affective and the self-evaluative reactions to exposure 
to others who are either better off or worse off was investigated. It was assumed 
that the affective reactions are primary and that the self-evaluative reactions 
are secondary. Therefore, we predicted that the strongest effects on both af-
fect and self-evaluation would be found when affect was assessed first and 
self-evaluation next. In line with this prediction, affective effects were found 
only when they were measured first, and not when they were measured after 
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self-evaluation. However, the effects on self-evaluation were the same whether 
they were measured first or last. Furthermore, individual differences in social 
comparison orientation were found to enhance the self-evaluative reactions, but 
not the affective reactions. 
Chapter 4.
We investigated the influence of individual differences in social comparison ori-
entation (SCO) on the affective responses to exposure to better- and worse-off 
others. We tested the hypothesis that people with higher SCO identify them-
selves more with downward and upward others, and will, therefore, be in a more 
negative mood after downward exposure and in a more positive mood after up-
ward exposure. In addition, we expected that people’s low levels of well-being, 
loneliness in this research, would moderate these effects. The results concerning 
upward exposure were not in accordance with our hypotheses, or other existing 
evidence, and we suggested that future research should investigate under what 
conditions people high in SCO do respond either positively or negatively to up-
ward exposure. In contrast, the results concerning exposure to a downward tar-
get were largely in line with our predictions as we found that people who were 
high in both SCO and loneliness were in the least positive mood after downward 
exposure. In addition, we found indications that the less positive reactions of in-
dividuals high in SCO to downward exposure may be partially attributed to their 
heightened identification with downward others. 
Chapter 5.
In two studies, we investigated how, when, and for whom exposure to a down-
ward target would be beneficial. Concerning the question of how, it was investi-
gated whether a social comparison process or an identification process leads to 
beneficial effects. Concerning the question of when, it was examined whether it 
is particularly when people are under threat (cf. Wills, 1981), or, more generally, 
when people find the comparison dimension personally important that down-
ward comparison is beneficial. Concerning the question of who, we predicted 
that only people with a high social comparison orientation would benefit from 
downward comparison. The results showed that, when people found the com-
parison dimension important, either because they were under threat or because 
they found it important to excel on the comparison dimension, comparison, and 
not identification, with the downward target had beneficial effects, but only 
when they were high in social comparison orientation. 
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General discussion 
Taken together, the present findings may further the understanding of people’s 
responses to others who are doing better or worse. Most importantly, the pres-
ent dissertation contributes to the social comparison literature by demonstrating 
1) the difference between affective and self-evaluative responses to upward and 
downward exposure, 2) the role of two processes underlying these responses, 
social comparison and identification, and 3) the role of individual differences in 
social comparison orientation and in subjective well-being. 
Difference between affective and self-evaluative responses.
A noteworthy conclusion of the present research concerns the distinction that was 
made between people’s affective and self-evaluative responses to exposure to oth-
ers. Whereas in previous research, typically either one of these types of responses 
was investigated, the present findings suggest that the conclusions that are drawn 
about how people respond to better-off and worse-off others depend heavily on 
whether affective or self-evaluative responses are considered. In all of the present 
studies, the affective and the self-evaluative responses differed from each other. 
This was most clearly the case in both studies reported in Chapter 2, in which the 
affective and self-evaluative responses were even in opposite directions. Upward 
exposure was found to evoke positive feelings, but, did not influence people’s 
self-evaluation. Downward exposure was found to evoke negative feelings and, 
simultaneously, to lead to a more positive self-evaluative response. In other words, 
an assimilative response to affect and a contrastive response to self-evaluation 
were found. Using a different type of measurement, the subsequent studies unam-
biguously showed that the affective and the self-evaluative responses can not be 
considered interchangeably. It was found that, whereas self-evaluative responses 
are unaffected by whether they are measured first or last, the affective responses 
were found only when they were measured directly after the exposure, implying 
that affective responses may occur prior to self-evaluative responses (Chapter 3). 
Also, people’s affective and self-evaluative responses to exposure to a downward 
target were found to be influenced differently by individual differences in social 
comparison orientation (Chapters 3, 4, and 5). In conclusion, the present findings 
suggest that affective and cognitive responses may stem from two independent 
mental systems, as proposed by dual process theories (Chaiken & Trope, 1999; see 
also Swann, Griffin, Predmore, & Gaines, 1987). By considering both kinds of re-
sponses, we were able to obtain a more refined understanding of how people are 
influenced by seeing others who are doing better or worse.
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The present findings suggested also that particularly the assessment of the af-
fective responses may be sensitive to the type of measurement that is used. 
When people were asked to indicate the feelings that exposure to an upward or 
a downward target evokes, that is, when the question referred explicitly to the 
target, their answers appeared to be congruent with the affective state of the 
target. Upward exposure evoked predominantly positive feelings and downward 
exposure evoked predominantly negative feelings. Furthermore, the affective re-
sponse was related to the degree to which people could identify themselves 
with the target and, thus, indicated something about the relation between the 
participant and the target (Chapter 2). In contrast, when people indicated their 
affective state when no reference to the target was made, their answer appeared 
to be more related to themselves (Chapter 3 and further). The affective reaction 
may then perhaps best be considered as the emotional forerunner of what the 
exposure implies for one’s self-evaluation. 
In line with the findings of the present thesis, other researchers also found that 
people’s affective and self-evaluative responses to upward and downward ex-
posure may differ. Buunk and Ybema (2003) recently found that, in a sample of 
married women in rural areas who compared their marriages with that of an up-
ward or downward target, the affective and self-evaluative responses diverged. 
Similar to the findings in Chapter 2, they found that upward exposure evoked 
more positive affect than did downward exposure, but that people’s self-evalua-
tions were more positive after exposure to the downward target than after expo-
sure to an upward target (see also Bui & Pelham, 1999; Stapel & Koomen, 2000). 
Thus, although the present research was limited to investigating the responses to 
upward and downward exposure on two comparison dimensions, social integra-
tion and academic performance in student populations, there is good reason to 
assume that the present findings may be generalised to other comparison dimen-
sions and populations. 
A possible limitation of the studies presented in this dissertation is that a con-
trol condition in which participants were not exposed to a target was not in-
cluded. This would have helped in making a more unequivocal interpretation of 
the findings concerning the affective and self-evaluative responses to exposure 
to upward and downward others. For example, it was found that people’s self-
evaluations were more positive after exposure to the downward target than after 
exposure to the upward target. Yet, it remained unclear whether people’s self-
evaluations had become more positive after exposure to the downward target 
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or whether self-evaluations had become more negative after upward exposure, 
or both. Although this would have been interesting to investigate, the present 
studies aimed to answer different questions. For instance, examining whether 
the order in which affective and self-evaluative responses are measured is impor-
tant does not require a control condition. Likewise, investigating the influence 
of individual differences in SCO on the responses to upward and downward ex-
posure, and the conditions under which exposure to a downward target results 
in positive outcomes, did not call for a control condition. Finally, in the studies 
described in Chapter 2, we used dependent variables that made a control condi-
tion superfluous. The questions assesing these variables measured directly how 
upward and downward exposure was perceived by the participants, for example, 
by asking the participants whether they were more or less satisfied with their 
own situation after reading about the target. Thus, although including a control 
condition in our studies would, in some cases, have strengthened the interpre-
tation of the results, most research questions we addressed did not require a 
control condition.
Two underlying processes: Social comparison and identification.
 A second aspect of the research presented in this dissertation concerns the role 
of two processes that were expected to underlie the affective and self-evaluative 
responses to upward and downward exposure: social comparison and identifica-
tion. When people were asked to list their spontaneous reactions while reading 
an interview with an upward or a downward target, those reactions revealed both 
social comparison and identification with the targets. Furthermore, the present 
thesis shows that the degree to which people compare and identify themselves 
with upward and downward others influences their affective and self-evaluative 
responses. In several studies in this dissertation, participants were instructed to 
either compare or identify themselves with an upward or a downward target, 
while, in others, participants’ affective and self-evaluative responses were cor-
related with the degree to which they had compared and identified themselves 
with the targets. In general, these studies showed that social comparison typical-
ly leads to contrastive responses whereas identification with the targets typically 
leads to assimilative responses. The studies described in Chapter 2 showed that, 
in line with our hypotheses, social comparison specifically underlay the contras-
tive responses to self-evaluation whereas identification specifically underlay the 
assimilative responses to affect. Note that, whereas the term social comparison 
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is often used to refer to both contrastive and assimilative responses to seeing 
others doing better or worse, the present dissertation showed that, when people 
really compare themselves with others, contrastive responses are typically found, 
and not assimilative responses (for similar findings, see Cattarin et al., 2000; 
Martin & Gentry, 1997). 
The finding that social comparison underlay the cognitive responses and identifi-
cation the affective responses can be taken as an indication that, as was assumed, 
the comparison process operates according to the rules of a cognitive system and 
identification operates according to the rules of an experiential system. However, 
the precise nature of the social comparison and identification processes was not 
investigated directly in this dissertation. Future research may be aimed at this; for 
example, with some additional reaction time and priming studies, it may be test-
ed whether identification is more automatic than social comparison, or whether 
social comparison is an automatic process, as suggested by Gilbert, Giesler, & 
Morris (1995). In addition, since it appeared that the comparison and identifica-
tion processes may occur simultaneously, it would be interesting to investigate 
how both processes may interact. For example, how may a first strong feeling of 
identification with a person influence subsequent comparison between the self 
and the other? 
Another issue that was briefly addressed in the present research, but that de-
serves more attention in future research, is that people’s responses to upward 
and downward others may be self-serving. That is, people may adjust the degree 
to which they compare and identify themselves with upward and downward 
others in such a way that they promote positive responses and prevent the oc-
currence of negative responses. In general, people compared themselves more 
with the downward target than with the upward target, whereas they identified 
themselves more with the upward target than with the downward target. As was 
shown, downward comparison and upward identification led to positive out-
comes whereas upward comparison and downward identification led to negative 
outcomes. This self-serving tendency is in line with the identification-contrast 
model of Buunk and Ybema (1997; see also Buunk & Ybema, 2003). Their model 
states that people strive for a sense of relative superiority through identifying 
themselves with upward others and through contrasting themselves with down-
ward others. However, the finding that people compared themselves more with 
downward others than with upward others is in contrast with the hypothesis of 
Festinger (1954), which states that people have a unidirectional drive to compare 
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upward. Stapel and Koomen (2001) also report a study in which they showed 
that people may use social comparison information in a self-serving way, par-
ticularly when the comparison dimension has high personal importance. In sum, 
social comparison and identification appeared to be important processes that 
distinctly influence people’s responses to upward and downward others. Identifi-
cation typically steered the responses in an assimilative direction, whereas social 
comparison typically steered the responses in a contrastive direction.
 
Individual differences in social comparison orientation and in subjective well-being. 
A third contribution of the present dissertation was the clarification of the role of 
individual differences in social comparison orientation and subjective well-being 
in responses to exposure to upward and downward others. Firstly, it appeared that 
people with a high SCO employ an unfavourable identification pattern. Whereas 
they tended to identify themselves more with others doing worse and others do-
ing equally well, they tended to identify themselves less with others doing better 
(Chapters 2 and 4). Although, in the studies discussed in Chapter 2, it appeared 
that people with a high SCO also identified themselves more with upward oth-
ers, it must be noted that the upward target in those studies was not evaluated 
as being better off but as being equally well off. This unfavourable identification 
tendency of people with a high SCO may be related to their somewhat neurotic 
personalities (Gibbons & Buunk, 1999). Furthermore, the different identifica-
tion tendencies of people with a low or a high SCO influenced the responses of 
people who were low in subjective well-being to exposure to worse-off others. 
Whereas Wills’ theory of downward comparison (1981) states that people who 
are low in subjective well-being may benefit from downward comparison, the 
present thesis offers some important qualifications and extensions of this theory. 
The present dissertation showed that people who are feeling lonely, and who 
are, in addition, high in SCO, tend to respond negatively to exposure to down-
ward others. This finding is in line with a study among sociotherapists by Buunk, 
Ybema, Gibbons, & Ipenburg (2001c), which showed that downward exposure 
evoked negative affect among those who were high in burnout and high in SCO. 
These findings suggest that, in general, when people are low in subjective well-
being and high in SCO, they do not benefit from exposure to a downward target, 
but, in contrast, tend to become more distressed by downward exposure. The 
present dissertation further suggests that this negative response of people low in 
subjective well-being and high in SCO may be partly due to their increased iden-
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tification with worse-off others. The studies in Chapter 5 confirmed this, but also 
showed a remedy for the negative responses to downward exposure for people 
low in subjective well-being and high in SCO. That is, when they were instructed 
to compare, rather than to identify, themselves with a person doing worse, they 
did not respond negatively, but very positively, to downward exposure. This im-
plies that, through comparing themselves with worse-off others these people 
can obtain a sense of being better-off than some others are. This result was in 
line with the findings of a study by Buunk, Olderma, & DeDreu (2001a) of rela-
tionship satisfaction. They found that people high in SCO who were, in addition, 
dissatisfied with their intimate relationship could enhance their satisfaction with 
their relationship by considering aspects of their relationship in which they were 
better than others. It thus seems that people with a low subjective well-being 
and a high SCO can benefit from exposure to a downward target only when 
their attention is directed at how they are better off than downward others, for 
example, by simply instructing them to compare themselves with the downward 
others. A possible extension of Wills’ theory that can be derived from the present 
dissertation is that downward comparison may be beneficial not only for people 
who are low in subjective well-being, but, more generally, for people for whom 
the comparison dimension has high personal importance. Chapter 5 showed 
that, similar to people who are low in subjective well-being, people who find it 
important to excel on the comparison dimension can benefit from comparing 
themselves with a worse-off other. Since being low in subjective well-being and 
finding it important to excel on a particular dimension can both make a dimen-
sion personally important, Wills’ theory may be extended to all dimensions that 
have high personal importance. 
Concerning the responses to upward others, the present thesis showed that 
those low and high in SCO do not differ much. However, other researchers have 
found that, depending on their level of well-being, those high and low in SCO 
differ in the degree to which they identify themselves with an upward target 
(Buunk, Ybema, Gibbons, & Ipenburg, 2001c). With lower levels of well-being, 
only those low in SCO identified themselves less with an upward other, whereas 
those high in SCO continued to identify themselves with an upward other, irre-
spective of their level of well-being. This finding seems to suggest that, among 
those low in subjective well-being, particularly those who are high in SCO may 
use upward comparison information in a profitable way. Nevertheless, more re-
search is needed into how people high and low in SCO differ in their responses 
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to upward others. 
Conclusions
Despite the limitations and unresolved issues mentioned above, the present dis-
sertation offers an interesting pattern of results concerning affective and self-
evaluative responses to exposure to others who are doing better or worse. Par-
ticularly by showing that affective and self-evaluative responses differ, or may 
even be opposite, the present dissertation is relevant to theory of and research 
into social comparison issues. Furthermore, insight was obtained into the pro-
cesses that underlie these responses. The degree to which people either compare 
or identify themselves with others appeared to steer their responses in opposite 
directions. The present thesis also showed how people with varying levels of 
social comparison orientation differ in their responses. Finally, the present dis-
sertation offers indications of how people for whom a particular domain is very 
important, either because they are low in subjective well-being in that domain or 
because they find it important to excel, may handle comparison with worse-off 
others and use it to their benefit. In conclusion, when people see others in their 
surroundings who are doing either better or worse than they are, it appears that 
it is sometimes more pleasant to listen to the heart, and others times more pleas-
ant to listen to the head. 
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Wanneer mensen anderen zien die in een gelijke situatie of wel beter af zijn 
of wel slechter af zijn, kan dat sterke reacties oproepen. Mensen kunnen als 
reactie sterke gevoelens ervaren als ook zichzelf en hun eigen situatie anders 
gaan beoordelen. Binnen de sociale psychologie zijn vele studies gedaan die deze 
reacties op confrontatie met opwaartse anderen (mensen die beter af zijn) en 
neerwaartse anderen (mensen die slechter af zijn) hebben bestudeerd. Over het 
algemeen laten deze studies zien dat er geen eenvoudig antwoord kan worden 
gegeven op de vraag hoe mensen geneigd zijn te reageren. Het blijkt dat op-
waartse en neerwaartse confrontatie beide zowel positieve als negatieve reacties 
kunnen oproepen (e.g., Buunk, Collins, Taylor, Van Yperen & Dakof, 1990, zie ook 
Brickman & Bulman, 1977; voor overzichten zie Blanton, 2001; en Suls & Wheeler, 
2000). Zo biedt confrontatie met een opwaartse ander bijvoorbeeld niet alleen 
de gelegenheid om te leren hoe je jezelf zou kunnen verbeteren, maar benadrukt 
ook je eigen ondergeschikte positie. Evenzo laat confrontatie met een neerwaar-
tse ander zowel zien hoe het met je zou kunnen aflopen, maar het geeft ook aan 
dat je zelf beter af bent. Om meer inzicht te verkrijgen in de reacties op opwaar-
tse en neerwaartse confrontatie richtten we ons in het huidige onderzoek op de 
processen die ten grondslag liggen aan deze reacties. We maakten hierbij gebruik 
van een duaal-proces benadering (Chaiken & Trope, 1999). In navolging van Ep-
stein (zie Epstein & Pacini, 1999; Epstein 2003) onderscheidden we een cognitief 
en een affectief informatieverwerkingssysteem. We veronderstelden dat binnen 
het cognitieve systeem mensen zich op systematische en analytisch wijze kunnen 
vergelijken met een ander, resulterend in een zelfbeoordelingsreactie. Daarbij ver-
wachtten we dat vergelijking met een opwaartse ander leidt tot een negatievere 
zelfbeoordeling en vergelijking met een neerwaartse ander tot een positievere 
zelfbeoordeling (contrasteffect). Daarnaast veronderstelden we dat binnen het 
affectieve systeem mensen zich op associatieve en holistische wijze kunnen iden-
tificeren met anderen, resulterend in een affectieve reactie. Daarbij verwachtten 
we dat identificatie met een opwaartse ander leidt tot een positieve affectieve 
reactie, en identificatie met een neerwaartse ander tot een negatieve affectieve 
reactie (assimilatie-effect). Door het gelijktijdig optreden van een vergelijkings- 
en een identificatieproces kunnen de affectieve en zelfbeoordelingsreacties 
na opwaartse en neerwaartse confrontatie dus tegengesteld zijn. Verder werd 
de invloed van individuele verschillen in de neiging om zich te vergelijken met 
anderen, aangeduid met het begrip sociale vergelijkingsoriëntatie onderzocht 
(SVO; Gibbons & Buunk, 1999). Op basis van eerder onderzoek, verwachtten we 
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dat mensen met een hoge SVO sterker worden beïnvloed door confrontatie met 
opwaartse en neerwaartse anderen (zie bijvoorbeeld Gibbons & Buunk, 1999; 
Van der Zee, Oldersma, Buunk & Bos, 1998b). In het huidige onderzoek werd 
nagegaan of dit komt doordat mensen met een hoge SVO zich meer vergelijken 
en/ of identificeren met anderen of doordat ze sterker worden beïnvloed door 
vergelijking en/ of identificatie met anderen dan mensen met een lage SVO. Tot 
slot onderzochtten we de reikwijdte van Wills neerwaartse vergelijkingstheorie 
(1981) die stelt dat mensen met een verlaagd subjectief welbevinden zich beter 
kunnen gaan voelen door zich te vergelijken met neerwaartse anderen. 
Om deze onderzoeksvragen te toetsen lieten we proefpersonen (studenten) een 
interview lezen met een medestudent die ofwel erg succesvol was of juist niet, 
waarna hun affectieve en zelfbeoordelingsreacties werden gemeten. In een aan-
tal studies werd daarnaast de mate waarin ze zich vergeleken en identificeerden 
met de student gemeten, terwijl in andere studies proefpersonen expliciet de 
opdracht te geven zich of wel te vergelijken of wel te identificeren met de stu-
dent in het interview. In de meeste studies was de vergelijkingsdimensie sociale 
integratie in het eerste studiejaar. In één studie beschreven in Hoofdstuk 5 was 
de vergelijkingsdimensie studieprestaties. Vooraf werden de individuele-verschil-
maten afgenomen. 
In hoofdstuk 2 worden twee onderzoeken beschreven. Het eerste onderzoek 
toonde aan dat de zelfbeoordelingsreactie positiever was na confrontatie met de 
neerwaartse ander dan na confrontatie met de opwaartse ander en, in overeen-
stemming met de hypothesen, vooral wanneer mensen zich hadden vergeleken 
met de ander. Verder werd gevonden dat de affectieve reactie positiever was na 
opwaartse confrontatie dan na neerwaartse confrontatie en, zoals voorspeld, 
vooral wanneer mensen zich identificeerden met de ander. In het tweede onder-
zoek werd de mate van vergelijking en identificatie experimenteel gemanipuleerd. 
De resultaten van deze studie bevestigden de resultaten van de eerste studie. In 
de vergelijkingsconditie was de zelfbeoordelingsreactie sterker terwijl in de iden-
tificatieconditie de affectieve reactie sterker was. Daarnaast bleek dat mensen 
met een hoge SVO zich zowel meer vergeleken als meer identificeerden met de 
ander ten opzichte van mensen met een lage SVO. Bovendien versterkte SVO de 
affectieve reactie na identificatie met de opwaartse ander: alleen bij mensen met 
een hoge SVO leidde een sterkere identificatie met de opwaartse ander tot een 
positievere affectieve reactie. 
In het derde hoofdstuk wordt een onderzoek beschreven naar de wisselwerking 
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tussen de affectieve en zelfbeoordelingsreacties na confrontatie met opwaartse 
en neerwaartse anderen. Aangenomen werd dat affectieve reacties, ontstaan 
binnen het affectieve systeem, eerder zouden optreden dan de zelfbeoordeling-
sreacties, ontstaan binnen het tragere cognitieve systeem (zie ook Zajonc, 1980). 
We verwachtten daarom de sterkste effecten op affect en zelfbeoordeling wan-
neer de affectieve reacties eerst werden gemeten en de zelfbeoordelingsreacties 
daarna, omdat dit de ‘natuurlijke gang van zaken’ volgt. In overeenstemming 
met deze hypothese werden de sterkste effecten op affect gevonden wanneer 
ze voor zelfbeoordeling werden gemeten en verdween het effect op affect zelfs 
als affect na zelfbeoordeling werd gemeten. Echter, de effecten op zelfbeoorde-
ling waren hetzelfde waneer ze voor of na affect werden gemeten. Verder bleken 
individuele verschillen in SVO de zelfbeoordelingsreactie te versterken, maar niet 
de affectieve reactie. 
In hoofdstuk 4 werd onderzocht hoe individuele verschillen in SVO de affectieve 
reacties na opwaartse en neerwaartse confrontatie beïnvloeden. De verwach-
ting was dat mensen met een hoge SVO zich sterker zouden identificeren met 
de opwaartse en neerwaartse ander, aangezien het maken van een vergelijking 
verondersteld dat men een zekere mate van gelijkheid met zichzelf en de ander 
waarneemt (cf. Festinger, 1954). Voorts verwachtten we dat als gevolg van deze 
sterkere identificatie mensen met een hoge SVO meer positief affect zouden 
ervaren na opwaartse confrontatie en meer negatief affect na neerwaartse con-
frontatie dan mensen met een lage SVO. Bovendien werd onderzocht hoe het 
niveau van welbevinden, eenzaamheid in deze studie, deze effecten zou mo-
dereren. Ten aanzien van opwaartse confrontatie waren de resultaten niet in 
overeenstemming met de hypothese. Mensen met een hoge SVO identificeerden 
zich juist minder met een opwaarste target dan mensen met een lage SVO en 
bovendien beïnvloedde SVO de affectieve reactie na opwaartse confrontatie niet. 
Ten aanzien van neerwaartse confrontie werden de hypothesen grotendeels wel 
bevestigd. Mensen met een hoge SVO identificeerden zich meer met de neer-
waartse ander dan mensen met een lage SVO. Bovendien ervoeren ze daarna veel 
negatief affect, vooral als ze zelf ook relatief eenzaam waren. We concludeerden 
dat mensen met een hoge SVO een ongunstig identificatiepatroon hanteren en 
als gevolg daarvan negatief reageren op neerwaartse confrontatie, vooral als ze 
zelf ook een laag subjectief welbevinden ervaren. 
In hoofdstuk 5 tenslotte worden twee studies gepresenteerd waarin werd onder-
zocht op welke manier, onder welke omstandigheden, en voor wie confrontatie 
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met neerwaartse anderen gunstige effecten geeft (zie ook Wills, 1980). Beide 
studies toonden aan dat neerwaarste confrontatie alleen positieve effecten op-
levert wanneer mensen zich vergelijken met de neerwaartse ander, en niet wan-
neer ze zich identificeren. Bovendien vonden we dat niet alleen mensen met een 
verlaagd subjectief welbevinden kunnen profiteren van neerwaartse vergelijking, 
maar ook mensen die willen excelleren op de vergelijkingsdimensie. Ten slotte 
bleken alleen mensen met een hoge SVO te kunnen profiteren van neerwaartse 
vergelijking en niet mensen met een lage SVO. 
Al met al kunnen de volgende conclusies getrokken worden op basis van de resul-
taten van de studies beschreven in dit proefschrift. Ten eerste blijkt het belangrijk 
te zijn om een onderscheid te maken tussen affectieve en zelfbeoordelingsreac-
ties na confrontatie met opwaartse en neerwaartse anderen. In alle onderzoeken 
verschilden de affectieve en zelfbeoordelingsreacties van elkaar en soms waren 
ze zelfs tegengesteld. Deze conclusie lijkt algemener te gelden dan in de situaties 
die in het huidige proefschrift werden onderzocht. Een onderzoek van Buunk 
en Ybema (2003) laat bijvoorbeeld zien dat ook in een steekproef van getrouwde 
plattelandsvrouwen die hun huwelijk vergeleken met opwaartse en neerwaartse an-
deren de affective en zelfbeoordelingsreacties tegengesteld waren, vergelijkbaar 
met de resultaten beschreven in Hoofdstuk 2. Verder toonde het huidige onder-
zoek aan dat affect een meer primaire reactie lijkt te zijn dan de zelfbeoorde-
lingsreactie (zie Hoofdstuk 3). Dergelijke bevindingen suggereren dat affectieve 
en zelfbeoordelingsreacties mogelijk voortkomen uit twee onafhankelijke men-
tale systemen, zoals voorgesteld door duaal-proces theorieën (Chaiken & Trope, 
1999, zie ook Swann, Griffin, Predmore, & Gaines, 1987). Door beide soorten re-
acties in ogenschouw te nemen waren we in staat een beter begrip te krijgen van 
hoe mensen reageren op confrontatie met opwaartse en neerwaartse anderen. 
Ten tweede toont dit onderzoek aan dat gelijktijdig een vergelijkingsproces en 
een identificatieproces kan optreden die de affectieve en zelfbeoordelingsreac-
ties van mensen in tegengestelde richtingen sturen. Vergelijking leidt tot con-
trastreacties terwijl identificatie tot assimilatiereacties leidt. Door het geven van 
een eenvoudige instructie tot of wel vergelijking of wel identificatie, konden we 
de reacties van mensen in tegengestelde richting sturen.
Een derde conclusie is dat, zoals verwacht, mensen met een hoge SVO sterker 
worden beïnvloed door confrontatie met betere en slechtere anderen dan mensen 
met een lage SVO. Enerzijds blijkt dit effect te moeten worden toegeschreven aan 
een sterkere beïnvloeding door identificatie met anderen, en anderzijds aan een 
117
Samenvatting
sterkere vergelijking én identificatie met anderen. Echter, aangezien mensen met 
een hoge SVO zich alleen sterker identificeren met neerwaartse anderen en juist 
minder met opwaartse anderen, geven zij blijk van een tamelijk ongunstig identi-
ficatiepatroon. Daarnaast vonden we dat mensen met een hoge SVO, wanneer zij 
bovendien een laag subjectief welbevinden hebben, bijzonder negatief reageren 
op confrontatie met neerwaartse anderen. Dit kon deels worden ver-klaard door 
het feit dat mensen met een hoge SVO zich sterker identificeren met neerwaartse 
anderen. Echter wanneer mensen met een hoge SVO de opdracht krijgen zich te 
vergelijken, in plaats van zich te identificeren met een neerwaartse ander, konden 
juist zij profiteren van de neerwaartse confrontatie. Daar-naast biedt de huidige 
dissertatie aanwijzingen voor hoe mensen voor wie een vergeljkingsdimensie erg 
belangrijk is, of wel omdat ze een laag welbevinden in dat gebied ervaren, of 
wel omdat ze het belangrijk vinden om te excelleren in dat gebied, vergelijking 
met neerwaartse anderen kunnen gebruiken om zich beter te voelen. Tot besluit, 
wanneer mensen anderen zien die het beter dan wel slechter doen dan zijzelf, 
blijkt het soms aangenamer om het hart te laten spreken en in andere gevallen 
om het verstand aan te wenden. 
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